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Catching Up with the Leaders: 
The Irish Hare
For many decades Ireland’s output per capita ranked about twenty-
fourth among the world’s industrial nations. Suddenly, in the mid-1990s
Ireland started to move up, from twenty-second in 1993 to eighteenth in
1997 and an amazing ninth in 1999.1 The many facets of Irish success
over these years, from a disproportionate representation in popular music
to the largest current account surplus in the industrial world, caught the
public imagination at home and abroad. This paper examines the startling
turnaround in Irish economic performance that began in the mid-1980s.
By comparison with Ireland’s previous economic performance there is
indeed a miracle to explain, but from a global perspective the question is
surely why it took so long for Ireland to catch up with the rest of Europe. 
Although most attention has focused on aggregate output growth
rates—real GDP growth averaged 10 percent a year over the period
1995–2000—we will show that the salient feature of Ireland’s catch-up
has been an increase in the proportion of the population at work. This is
partly a function of demographic trends and partly of a remarkable reduc-
tion in the rate of unemployment, neither of which can be repeated. When
the data are correctly interpreted, there has been no productivity miracle,
as some have claimed, and Ireland’s ranking in terms of average living
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1. Ofﬁcial GDP per capita data for 2001 put Ireland ahead of all the other EU countries
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tistics quoted above—although the performance of the labor market dur-
ing the 1990s was marvelous. Dissecting the sources of output growth and
understanding the transformation of the labor market are the two central
tasks of this paper. In addition, we describe how inappropriate ﬁscal and
perhaps monetary policies held Ireland back in earlier years, with the
result that convergence, when it occurred, was telescoped into a short
period.2
Catching up, and doing so rapidly, requires a favorable institutional,
policy, and external environment. Several individual institutions and pol-
icy entities in Ireland are each quietly conﬁdent that it is the unique source
of the turnaround. As our story unfolds, it will become evident that the
credit must be widely shared, and that a much improved external environ-
ment also played its part. 
Background
In a letter to David Ricardo in 1817, Robert Malthus said, “a popula-
tion greatly in excess of the demand for labour” was “the predominant
evil of Ireland.”3 This was a generation before the famines of the 1840s
triggered large-scale emigration and a decline in the national population
that continued until the 1960s. Irish adjustment during the nineteenth
century has been cited as a good example of how globalization fostered
convergence of living standards. The island was transformed from a
poverty-stricken, peasant economy that had served as a source of cheap
labor for booming cities in Britain and North America to an economy
that, at the start of the twentieth century, boasted wages—in some sectors
of the urban economy at least—close to those prevailing across the Irish
Sea.4
But the rural population and unskilled urban workers, who predomi-
nated, continued to lag behind, and in the course of the twentieth century
2 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
2. We prefer Aesop’s hare, long somnolent, dashing to catch up with the slow and
steady tortoise, as a metaphor for the Irish economy’s recent performance over the more
widely touted “Celtic tiger.” The latter is zoologically improbable, whereas the hare is one
of the largest wild animals actually native to Ireland. 
3. Quoted in Sraffa (1952, p. 175).
4. O’Rourke and Williamson (1999, pp. 21–22).
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through two world wars provided adequate export revenue for what was
still primarily an agrarian economy, especially that part of the island that
became the Republic of Ireland, which is the subject of this paper.
Economic historians characterize the third quarter of the twentieth
century as the “Golden Age” of European growth.5 Most Western Euro-
pean economies, having recovered from wartime damage by around 1950,
continued to grow more rapidly than before or since until the ﬁrst oil shock
in 1973. Ireland did not share in this happy experience—indeed, only the
United Kingdom had a lower rate of per capita output growth over those
years. In the 1950s Ireland stumbled badly, with a renewed surge of emi-
gration, and it continued to exhibit the symptoms of a labor-surplus econ-
omy, not so much in the rate of unemployment as in emigration and a
declining population, a low participation rate of women in paid employ-
ment, and continued dependence on a largely subsistence agriculture.
Conditions became more promising during the 1960s. Growth acceler-
ated somewhat, and the overall policy stance looked increasingly benign
in terms of macroeconomic management, human capital formation, and
openness to the international economy. The exchange rate was pegged to
the pound sterling, macroeconomic policy was characterized by a modest
balance of payments deﬁcit, and the ﬁscal stance was conservative,
observing the “golden rule” of borrowing only to ﬁnance public capital
investment. Taxation was relatively low, taking less than 30 percent of
GNP, compared with an average of over 36 percent across all member
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD). Inward foreign direct investment (FDI) was encouraged by
grant incentives, a proﬁts tax exemption, and, from the 1970s onward,
duty-free access to the rest of the European Economic Community (EEC),
which Ireland joined in 1973.6 Educational attainment was rapidly
increasing as a result of the belated introduction of universal free sec-
ondary education in 1967.
Although income per capita was low relative to that in the United King-
dom (by far Ireland’s largest trading and ﬁnancial partner, the main desti-
nation for its emigrants, and at that stage still the dominant reference point
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5. van Ark and Crafts (1996).
6. Although foreshadowed earlier, the shift to an outward-oriented policy is usually
dated to a suite of policy changes launched in 1958. Another early milestone was the
Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement (1965).
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close to the U.K. level. Ireland’s continued backwardness reﬂected, above
all, the modest share of the population in higher-productivity nonagricul-
tural activities. That GDP per capita was 27 percent lower than in the
United Kingdom in 1973 (table 1) reflected, first, a labor force participa-
tion rate that was 19 percent lower, and second, the fact that almost a
quarter of those at work in Ireland were engaged in agriculture, where
income per capita was 40 percent below that in the United Kingdom.
Average nonagricultural output per person engaged was virtually the
same in both countries. These points illustrate the trap into which the
uncritical discussion of convergence based on the broadest aggregates
can lead. 
Thus, in 1973, an optimist could—and some did—foresee a steady
convergence in living standards to reach those of the United Kingdom and
other advanced European economies within a generation, especially as
rising participation by a better-educated work force in the modern,
export-driven, nonagricultural sector lifted average income per capita.7
Indeed, the situation at the end of the twentieth century can be seen as the
fulﬁllment of that prediction. The policy stance had by then reverted to
the earlier one: once more there was a ﬁxed exchange rate, and the current
account and the ﬁscal accounts were both in surplus for most recent years.
Tax revenue as a share of GNP was again in the lowest third of the OECD
countries, and unemployment was at a historic low—and lower than in
most other industrial countries. The nonagricultural work force now
includes 40 percent of the population, compared with 28 percent in 1973
(ﬁgure 1). The dependency ratio peaked in 1986 at 224 dependents per
100 employed. By 2001 it was down to 124. As a result, GNP per capita is
now close to the industrial-country average.8
Ireland’s convergence on the leaders in terms of output per capita in
the last quarter of the century was thus essentially the result of employing
a new generation—one with higher educational qualiﬁcations and, in the
case of women, a higher propensity to labor force participation—in the
modern sector and, notably, outside of traditional agriculture. At one
level, therefore, Ireland’s achievement does not seem all that special:
4 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
7. Higher incomes in agriculture were also in prospect, thanks to the stimulus of high
EEC support prices.
8. Our characterization of Irish convergence here ﬁnds some U.S. echoes in Caselli and
Coleman (2001).
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among the world’s most productive and prosperous countries.9 The chal-
lenge is to explain the belatedness and speed of the catch-up and espe-
cially the employment boom of the 1990s.
The two snapshots, as of 1973 and as of 2001, conceal the fact that the
path between them was anything but stable. Thrown badly off course by
the first oil crisis and the policy response to it, Ireland lacked the condi-
tions for continued steady convergence for the first fifteen years or so of
the intervening period. Lacking in particular were a stable fiscal
environment and a wage formation process that would keep Irish labor
competitive. 
Instead, an attempt to force a quick recovery from the slump of the
mid-1970s gave rise to wage pressures and ﬁscal imbalances that left Ire-
land ill prepared for the high global interest rates and weak foreign
demand of the early 1980s, not least from Margaret Thatcher’s Britain.
Thus the aggressive ﬁscal expansion in the late 1970s helped drive up real
wages and crowd out sustainable growth of productive capacity. Subse-
quently, the spiraling debt, high tax rates, and high interest rates of the
early 1980s perpetuated conditions hostile to sustained growth. High
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9. Ó Gráda and O’Rourke (2000).
Table 1. Productivity and Employment in Ireland and the United Kingdom, 1973
Units as indicated
United Ratio
Item Ireland Kingdom (percent)
Alternative productivity measuresa (Irish pounds)
GDP per capita 856 1,173 73
GDP per worker 2,380 2,642 90
Agricultural output per workerb 1,634 2,726 60
Nonagricultural output per worker 2,605 2,640 99
Employment
Total employment (percent of population) 36.0 44.4 81
Agricultural employment 
(percent of total employment) 23.2 3.0 780
Nonagricultural employment 
(percent of population) 27.6 43.1 64
Sources: Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) database; Eurostat; United Kingdom Ofﬁce for National Statistics,
Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1985; and Hitchens, Wagner, and Birnie (1990).
a. Based on ofﬁcial productivity data. These data are later adjusted to take account of overstated proﬁts from foreign MNCs,
but the adjustment for 1973 would be less than 2 percent.
b. Includes forestry and ﬁshing.
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with the apparently inexorable rise in debt, sapped business conﬁdence. In
addition, ﬁscal policy resulted in a sizable net withdrawal of demand as
the authorities struggled to limit deﬁcits even as external debt service
grew rapidly. Thus, although inﬂation and the external deﬁcit came down,
these were years of deep recession in Ireland, when the economy pre-
sented a very weak picture. The net result was that, by 1986, there was a
lot more catching up to do.10
By this time everyone concerned realized that a more disciplined
demand management policy was required. But that realization was not in
itself sufﬁcient to ensure convergence. When ﬁscal and demand condi-
tions stabilized, real wage moderation took center stage in smoothing the
process of employment transition. We will argue that the institutional
arrangements for wage bargaining and the harsh realities of high unem-
6 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
10. “Poorest of the Rich” was the title used by The Economist in January 1988 for its
survey of the Irish economy. When it revisited the topic in May 1997, the title was
“Europe’s Shining Light.”
Figure 1. Nonagricultural Employment, 1961–2001
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from Central Statistics Ofﬁce Ireland, Demography and Labour Force data; and
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) database.
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reduced real wage growth below the rates recorded in Ireland’s trading
partners and greatly facilitated employment growth. In contrast to the
East Asian miracle economies, accumulation of physical capital, includ-
ing public infrastructure, has not played an important driving role,
although our measures may miss a crucial change in the quality of invest-
ment in the 1990s. 
Although the rapid reduction in unemployment, the ﬁscal turnaround,
and the very high recorded rates of output growth in the subsequent ﬁf-
teen years reﬂect a strong improvement in competitiveness (measured as
wage rates relative to those of Ireland’s trading partners, expressed in a
common currency), partly associated with a successful process of central-
ized wage bargaining, they also owe much to more favorable external
conditions. The external impetus provided by FDI from the United States
and other countries has had a multidimensional impact on economic per-
formance. These have been the booster rockets that were needed to lift
Ireland into the higher orbit in which it travels today. 
The whole period since 1973 thus appears as a long business cycle,
with a deep and prolonged trough in the first half of the 1980s and a cli-
macteric around end-century, superimposed on a secular transition in the
population structure and in the patterns of labor force participation and
employment.11 Although we emphasize convergence, some distinctive
features of the Irish economy at the start of the twenty-first century
clamor for attention. It is among the most globalized economies in the
world, with (for example) more than half of its manufacturing and finan-
cial sectors owned by foreigners. The total value of exports exceeds
GNP and is just a little below GDP (a constant source of puzzlement to
undergraduates).
An exceptional propensity to emigrate has long been an Irish charac-
teristic, and during the boom this was replaced by a high immigration
rate. This aspect of Ireland’s openness to the rest of the world has
undoubtedly contributed to the economy’s ability to experience rapid
employment growth: the roughly 50,000 jobs added annually in the 1990s
are only a small fraction of overall employment in the industrial coun-
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11. The business cycle was also partly driven by developments in the United Kingdom.
The openness of the economy, including its openness to migration, and the pegged
exchange rate regime in place for much of the time have always made deﬁning, measuring,
and explaining an Irish business cycle a nonstandard exercise.
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porations puts an unduly ﬂattering gloss on some Irish economic statis-
tics, notably measures of productivity, which, when correctly interpreted,
appear solid rather than miraculous.
The remainder of the paper looks at these three key elements. It starts
by focusing on demand management policy, explaining the failures and
successes of ﬁscal and monetary policy that ﬁrst delayed and then
strongly assisted the economic convergence. (Box 1 discusses the politi-
cal economy of this period.) The next section looks at how the labor mar-
ket functioned. The fact that this market, long cleared through emigration,
suddenly saw enough job creation to achieve both full employment and
net immigration is the nub of the matter. We then analyze trends in the
level and composition of output and of productivity, showing that the dis-
tinctive patterns of Ireland’s productive structure and faster productivity
growth played limited roles in the recent success. (An appendix explores
the implications of the exceptional industries dominated by afﬁliates of
U.S. corporations for measures of income and productivity.) Finally, we
ask what lessons can be exported to other countries and, in particular,
whether one can isolate any policy ingredient as being the determining
factor in Ireland’s success.
Managing Demand: Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Ireland is not alone in having experienced severe macroeconomic
imbalances in the past quarter century, but their amplitude has been
greater than in almost any other OECD country. The early 1980s saw the
worst extremes. In 1981 inflation was 21 percent, the current account
deficit was about 15 percent of GNP, and public sector borrowing was
running at an even higher rate. The attempt to rein in the twin deficits
caused taxation to jump by 10 percentage points of GNP in seven years,
while overt unemployment soared to 16 percent of the labor force in 1986
and net emigration approached 1 percent of the population. Nevertheless,
government debt continued to grow, on some measures reaching almost
130 percent of GNP in 1986. 
Contrast those figures with the situation in 2001, when the unemploy-
ment rate fell as low as 3.8 percent, despite a dramatic rise in the labor
force participation rate and substantial net immigration. Taxation had
8 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
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Box 1. Why Did Governments Act As They Did? Interpreting Fiscal Policy in
the 1970s and Early 1980s
How is one to explain the three contrasting approaches to ﬁscal policy in Ire-
land in the last quarter century: aggressively expansionary from 1977, tax-
and-spend from 1981, and aggressively cost-cutting from 1987?1 The
explanation is to be found partly in the government’s pursuit of ﬂawed eco-
nomic models, partly in shifting external developments, and partly in parlia-
mentary dynamics. But above all it can be interpreted in terms of shifting
political cost-beneﬁt calculations.
The strategy adopted by the incoming government in 1977 was prompted
by the high levels that unemployment had reached, making its resolution seem
the appropriate primary goal of policy, and by the low—indeed, sharply
negative—real interest rates that had prevailed for the previous few years.
Also inﬂuential was an ingrained skepticism about the likelihood that private
enterprise would ever generate sufﬁcient employment. Given this environ-
ment, borrowing to ﬁnance an expansion in employment seemed more attrac-
tive than ever before. But the policy was ﬂawed on three fronts. First, the low
real interest rates would prove, unsurprisingly, to be a temporary aberration.
Second, the ability of a “buy Irish” campaign to neutralize the balance of pay-
ments consequences of the ﬁscal expansion (whether through spending or
competitiveness effects or both) was largely illusory. Third, the responsive-
ness of the Irish unemployment rate to expansionary ﬁscal policy was much
less than one for one with job creation. (As a rule of thumb, summarizing
econometric evidence, for every two jobs created, one person was added to the
work force in the short term, mainly through the return migration ﬂow but also
through rising participation.) Jobs were created, and unemployment did fall,
but too many of the jobs were dependent either directly on government spend-
ing or indirectly on deﬁcit ﬁnance, both of which would prove unsustainable.
In the event, external events worsened affairs even more than the govern-
ment ought to have provided for. Global developments in 1979–80 heightened
the realization that the ﬁscal path was unsustainable, and this was widely rec-
ognized by the time of the change of government in 1981. From then until 
(continued)
1. As shown by Lane (1998), ﬁscal policy was deﬁnitely procyclical in this period,
and it may have continued to be so to the end of the century, although deciding this is
bedeviled by the acute difﬁculty of measuring the output gap appropriately.
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Box 1. Why Did Governments Act As They Did? Interpreting Fiscal Policy in
the 1970s and Early 1980s (continued)
1987 there was a succession of insecure coalition or minority governments,
whose ﬁscal policy replaced the defeat of unemployment with a new overrid-
ing objective of stabilizing the ﬁscal position subject to the constraint of main-
taining adequate levels of public services and income support mechanisms.
Continued support from the Labour Party required the latter, and it was a hall-
mark of the ensuing recession that rates of unemployment assistance and other
income support payments were maintained in real terms.2 These dual goals
implied a continued increase in spending, as interest rates and unemployment
continued to rise, combined with spiraling tax rates, calculated in each budget
more or less as a residual: what would be needed after the debt markets had
been tapped to the maximum extent possible. This holding operation was
barely sustainable; suspension of much of the public capital spending program
helped reduce the primary deﬁcit substantially, but rising debt service charges
meant that the debt was still growing faster than GNP. Furthermore, with the
high tax rates and massive borrowing certainly discouraging private sector ini-
tiative, and the deep recession in the United Kingdom inhibiting outmigration
for several years, unemployment continued its inexorable rise.
A new political conﬁguration from 1987 onward allowed a more single-
minded approach to ﬁscal stabilization.
3 By stealing the outgoing govern-
ment’s rhetoric, the new leaders made cutting government expenditure no
longer a political taboo, and at last ﬁscal policy was addressed to an attainable
objective function. Furthermore, external circumstances improved dramati-
cally, with a worldwide fall in interest rates accompanied by a tightening of
labor market conditions in the United Kingdom, which allowed emigration in
the late 1980s to lower Irish unemployment and its associated ﬁscal costs.
Stricter enforcement of the social welfare code became more politically toler-
able as the numbers dependent on transfers began to decline. 
2. By comparison with the continental European countries, however, income sup-
port payments have long been set at a relatively low percentage of average income.
3. Seidmann (1987) showed that although the new government also relied on inde-
pendent deputies, it was more secure, as measured in terms of Shapley value (a measure
of the power of opposition groups to form winning coalitions), than any of the previous
governments during the decade. Additionally, the leader of the opposition committed
the main opposition party to supporting the government’s ﬁscal stabilization (in the so-
called Tallaght strategy).
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fiscal surplus from exceeding 5 percent of GNP in 2000, bringing the
government debt–to–GNP ratio down to 38 percent by the end of 2001.
There was just a small deficit in the current account that year, and infla-
tion, although above the European Central Bank’s target, fell to around
4.5 percent.
This compares trough with peak, however, and indeed from mid-2001
the economy began to slow, with unemployment rising slightly and the
ﬁscal accounts deteriorating quite sharply. Nevertheless, the contrast over
the two decades is startling, and to interpret it requires a narrative
approach explaining what happened and why. 
Falling into the Debt Trap
Happily, it is possible to abstract from higher-frequency ﬂuctuations
and concentrate on the big picture of a single long cycle in macro-
economic imbalances in Ireland during the last quarter of the twentieth
century.12 Figure 2 shows this cyclical evolution of internal and external
balance, with the former measured by unemployment and the latter by the
current account deﬁcit. Although the ﬁgure echoes developments in other
countries for parts of the period, the amplitude and duration of this single
cycle are unique among the industrial countries. And, given the fact that
immigration was high when unemployment was low (and vice versa), the
ﬁgure even understates the amplitude of the internal disequilibria.13 Rec-
ognizing the existence of this long cycle has methodological implications
for our analysis. First, it means that we are not dealing only with growth
theory—as have most previous attempts to understand the Irish miracle—
but that an important part of the analysis needs to focus on stabilization
policy: on the ﬁscal and monetary policy responses to external shocks and
shifting state variables over the period. Second, to the extent that the
whole period represents a single observation or cycle, it limits the kind of
econometric work that can be done on the broad time-series characteris-
tics: numerous slow-moving variables also display a single cycle over this
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12. Here and elsewhere in the paper, for data before 1995 we use the consistent histor-
ical series maintained by the Economic and Social Research Institute. We are very grateful
to John FitzGerald for making this database available to us.
13. On the other hand, the coincidence of high inﬂation and nominal interest outﬂows
means that the current account deﬁcit is somewhat overstated at its height. 
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inconclusive.14
The length and amplitude of this cycle must, however, be mainly
attributed to some serious policy errors. Figure 3 traces several macro-
economic and budgetary aggregates over the period. In essence, the oil
price crisis of 1973–74 triggered a sequence of short-termist demand
management responses that kept the economy out of equilibrium and
inhibited sustainable job creation for almost two decades. The initial deci-
sion to ﬁnance the oil crisis with borrowing paralleled decisions in the
United Kingdom. Government debt and inﬂation surged, while unem-
ployment rose in tandem with that in Britain. A ﬁscal correction was ini-
tiated by 1976, but it was the decision to respond to the lingering high
12 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
14. We chose the variables in ﬁgure 2 in preference to plotting wage inﬂation against
unemployment (such a plot would also generally move in a large loop, though with many
eddies); that alternative is not easy to read as a shifting Phillips curve, not only because
high international labor mobility has implied a signiﬁcant medium-term inﬂuence of U.K.
unemployment conditions on those in Ireland, but also because, especially before 1979,
ﬂuctuations in external inﬂation were rapidly imported through the ﬁxed exchange rate. 
Figure 2. Internal and External Balance, 1961–2001
Sources: Central Statistics Ofﬁce Ireland, National Income and Expenditure, 2000; and ESRI database.
a. Measured by the International Labour Ofﬁce (ILO) deﬁnition.
b. Central Bank of Ireland estimate.
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in 1977 that, by the end of the decade, had placed government ﬁnances on
a dangerously unstable path.15 New spending programs, expansion of
public sector employment, and higher rates of transfer payments all trans-
lated into a hard-to-ﬁnance ratcheting up of current government expendi-
ture. The debt-to-GNP ratio was rising rapidly (top left panel of ﬁgure 3),
with an increasing share of the debt being borrowed from abroad and
denominated in foreign currency. This left the government with little
room to maneuver in response to the next adverse shock, which came with
the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the tightening of U.K. and global mon-
etary policy. 
By 1981 rising interest rates and weakening external demand condi-
tions meant that the ﬁscal deﬁcit was increasing rapidly (top right panel of
ﬁgure 3) even though policy had turned contractionary.16 Thus the auto-
matic stabilizers, especially income support payments, worked against the
early attempts at ﬁscal correction, as unemployment soared as a result of
the combined effect of the cutback in the primary deﬁcit and adverse
shocks from the deteriorating labor market conditions in the United King-
dom. The impact of these deﬂationary forces on employment and output
was aggravated by the fact that the liberalized trading environment had
weakened many of Ireland’s traditional, formerly heavily protected indus-
tries. Employment in these industries contracted by about 25 percent—or
30,000 jobs—in the ﬁrst half of the 1980s. The rapid demise of these jobs
was undoubtedly hastened by the contraction of demand, which it in turn
intensiﬁed. 
By the mid-1980s even paying for current spending programs was
proving difficult. Every year from 1979 on, the share of taxes in GNP
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15. An alternative, generational accounting approach to ﬁscal policy presents a very
different picture for Ireland. Indeed, because of relatively favorable demographics (dis-
cussed below), Ireland has, from this alternative perspective, had one of the stronger ﬁscal
positions among OECD countries throughout the period under review (McCarthy and
Bonin, 1999; Cronin and McCoy, 2000). In a sense, then, the Irish ﬁscal crisis was one
more of liquidity than of underlying long-term imbalance, but there is a limit to what one
can borrow in the markets on the strength of a favorable generational account balance.
16. The last column of table 2 presents a model-based measure, due to Duffy and oth-
ers (2000), of the discretionary change in ﬁscal policy in each year from the previous year.
It shows that discretionary ﬁscal policy was progressively tightened in each of the four
years 1981 to 1984. Further, and sharper, tightening occurred in each of the three years
1987 to 1989. Although cyclically adjusted budget ﬁgures are controversial, the Blanchard
(1990) approach gives a broadly similar time path of the budgetary stance.
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Figure 3. Macroeconomic and Budgetary Aggregates, 1970–2001
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from Central Statistics Ofﬁce Ireland, National Income and Expenditure, 2000;
ESRI database; and Department of Finance, Budget 2002, 2002.
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scrambled to find additional revenue to meet the soaring spending (mid-
dle left panel of figure 3). Tax rates on alcohol and tobacco, as well as on
television sets and other consumer durables, were so high that cross-
border smuggling from Northern Ireland to the Republic became ram-
pant. Some rates were above revenue-maximizing levels and were
subsequently lowered, with an apparent gain in revenue.17 The spiraling
tax take had put upward pressure on wage rate negotiations despite rising
unemployment. Although the primary deficit began to fall as early as
1983, the debt ratio grew to perilous levels, sufficient to prompt sugges-
tions that default would be an attractive option.18 By 1986 fiscal policy
was at the crossroads.
The Fiscal Recovery: An Expansionary Fiscal Contraction?
The rapid turnaround in the ﬁscal accounts—for which the decisive
date is 1987—took everybody by surprise. Not only was the marked tight-
ening of policy by the incoming government unexpected (see the last col-
umn of table 2, and box 1), but the speed with which borrowing and the
debt ratio responded was also unforeseen. However, the contribution of
greatly improved external conditions (table 3) should not be underrated.
With the economy turning around, it is not surprising that some authors
pointed to the dramatic ﬁscal correction as an important part of the expla-
nation of Ireland’s altered fortunes, arguing that this was an example of
an “expansionary ﬁscal contraction” (EFC).19 Subsequent work cast doubt
on the mechanisms proposed.20 Indeed, a glance at the sequence of events
(exports leading consumption, which in turn leads investment; see the
ﬁrst four data columns of table 2 for 1987–90) shows that the conﬁdence
story underlying the simpliﬁed version of the EFC hypothesis has an
uphill struggle to ﬁnd empirical support in Ireland.
Yet the ﬁscal correction was undoubtedly a necessary precondition for
the subsequent improved performance. Spiraling tax rates and an appar-
ently runaway debt-to-GNP ratio cannot have encouraged entrepreneurial
Patrick Honohan and Brendan Walsh 15
17. FitzGerald and others (1988).
18. This view was espoused, for example, by Dornbusch (1989).
19. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990); McAleese (1990).
20. Barry and Devereux (1994); Bradley and Whelan (1997).
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0675-01 BPEA/Honohan  7/22/02  1:15 PM  Page 17or investor conﬁdence in Ireland.21 Even though taxation as a percentage
of GNP had peaked in 1984 (apart from a spike in tax receipts under the
amnesty of 1988; middle left panel of ﬁgure 3) and marginal rates had
started to fall sharply (ﬁgure 4), only by 1988–89 was it clear that the debt
situation had been brought under control, which was perhaps a precondi-
tion for the recovery of investment. Comparing 2001 with 1985, the top
rate of income tax has come down from 65 percent to 42 percent; of stan-
dard corporate tax from 50 percent to 16 percent; of capital gains tax from
60 percent to 20 percent; and of capital acquisitions tax from 55 percent to
20 percent.
The speciﬁc ﬁscal steps taken in 1987 were quite orthodox: a tempo-
rary freeze on all public sector recruitment—implying a sharp fall in num-
bers employed, and thus in the public sector wage bill22—combined with
(further) cutbacks in public capital spending (bottom left panel of ﬁg-
ure 3). The better external conditions helped turn the automatic stabilizers
around (the bottom right panel of ﬁgure 3 shows that transfer payments
fell), as ﬁrst emigration and then a pickup in labor demand at home low-
ered unemployment. Falling interest rates also helped, and when the debt-
to-GNP ratio started to fall in 1987, the positive feedback became
cumulative.23
18 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
21. Certainly it also put upward pressure on wage rates (see Curtis and FitzGerald,
1996; FitzGerald, 1999).
22. Already not all vacancies were being ﬁlled, putting an end to any expectation that
government would act as an employer of last resort.
23. Actually, the decline in inﬂation during the early 1980s meant that the measured
ﬁscal accounts ﬂattered reality. Inﬂation-adjusted accounts show a less steep cyclical
amplitude in both ﬁscal and international payments deﬁcits; qualitatively, however, the
story is unaffected by such an adjustment. 
Table 3. External Conditions Facing Ireland in the 1980s 
Percent a year
Item 1981–84a 1986–89
Average U.K. GDP growth 1.6 4.1
Average annual change in U.K. unemployment rate 1.4 –1.2
Average U.S. short-term nominal interest rateb 10.7 6.7
Source: Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Economy, Statistical Annex, no. 44, 1997.
a. Data for 1985 are omitted because it is a transition year.
b. U.S. inﬂation was about 1.2 percentage points higher in 1981–84 than in 1986–89. The dollar appreciated 40 percent over
1981–84 and depreciated 24 percent over 1986–89.
0675-01 BPEA/Honohan  7/22/02  1:15 PM  Page 18Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in the 1980s: 
A Complicating Factor
Abandonment of the link to sterling in 1979 in favor of membership in
the new adjustable-peg regime of the European Monetary System (EMS)
was an additional, and on the whole unhelpful, element of stabilization
policy. The decision to join the EMS was made on strategic diplomatic
and political grounds, with economic arguments playing only an inciden-
tal role. It certainly did not reﬂect any attempt to escape the discipline of
Ireland’s quasi-currency board arrangement, which had been in place in
one form or another for 150 years. If anything, policymakers expected the
new regime to result in an appreciation of the Irish pound against sterling
(which had been notably weak since the mid-1960s), and subsidies were
granted from Europe to ease the burden of adjusting to what was believed
would be a tougher regime. 
In the event, realignments in the EMS were frequent, and, at least for
the ﬁrst decade, Ireland was not slow to avail itself of these opportunities
to retain wage competitiveness. In seven of the eleven realignments in the
Patrick Honohan and Brendan Walsh 19
Figure 4. Average and Marginal Income Tax Rates on Average Earnings, 1979–2002a
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Department of Finance annual Budget for the relevant year.
a. Male industrial worker taxed as a single person; includes social security employee levies.
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0675-01 BPEA/Honohan  7/22/02  1:15 PM  Page 19ﬁrst decade of the EMS, the Irish pound was devalued against the
deutsche mark. With two exceptions, Ireland always pursued the modal
realignment. The exceptions were triggered by the two sharp real appreci-
ations that occurred as a result of a weakening sterling in 1983 and 1986.
And they imparted an additional cumulative 9 percent depreciation to the
Irish pound in the 1980s, making it weaker than all but the French franc
and the lira in that period. Rather than a “zone of monetary stability” or a
genuine hard currency peg, the EMS proved to be, for Ireland, a dragging
anchor. All in all, membership weakened anti-inﬂationary discipline and
increased uncertainty. Interest rates, adjusted for currency depreciation,
averaged about 250 basis points above those in Germany—and much
higher during several pre-realignment surges. This has been interpreted as
a “peso” premium,24 although domestic policy in the form not only of
high government borrowing, but also of technical deﬁciencies in mone-
tary policy implementation, added to the volatility and average level of
interest rates before 1988.25
On the other hand, decoupling from sterling just as it was about to
appreciate in the early 1980s fortuitously protected Ireland from an addi-
tional severe competitiveness shock.26 Relative to those of Ireland’s main
trading partners, exchange rate–corrected wage rates increased on aver-
age by about 1 percent a year, in both the 1970s and into the 1980s, with
no evident acceleration after EMS membership. After 1986, however,
there does appear to have been a sharp improvement in the trend of wage
competitiveness (ﬁgure 5).27
The devaluation of 1986, initiated as a defensive measure in light of
the loss of competitiveness associated with a rapid depreciation of ster-
ling, was especially timely in that sterling suddenly recovered, leaving
Ireland well placed in terms of wage competitiveness to beneﬁt from the
20 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
24. Honohan and Conroy (1994); Walsh (1993).
25. Honohan and Conroy (1994).
26. The sharp appreciation of sterling against all EMS currencies during 1979–81
brought the Irish pound to as low as 74 U.K. pence—a nominal bilateral depreciation of
over 25 percent in just two years.
27. The competitiveness indicator shown in ﬁgure 5 represents a weighted average of
the hourly earnings in Ireland’s main trading partners divided by the same measure in Ire-
land (all expressed in a common currency, and relative to the projection of a linear trend
from 1975 to 1987). The series shown is that published by the Department of Finance in its
annual Economic Review and Outlook. (The series in the Central Bank of Ireland’s Bulletin
shows a stronger improvement in competitiveness during the 1990s, apparently because of
different country weights.)
0675-01 BPEA/Honohan  7/22/02  1:15 PM  Page 20accelerating economic boom in the United Kingdom and in other trading
partners after 1987. As it happened, this was the ﬁrst step in a sustained
improvement in wage competitiveness.
The Turnaround in Wage Competitiveness
The data in ﬁgure 5, based on average hourly earnings in industry in
Ireland compared with its main trading partners, need to be treated with
caution: the series relates only to industry and is not adjusted for impor-
tant shifts in age, skill, and sectoral composition.28 Nevertheless, partial
Patrick Honohan and Brendan Walsh 21
28. At the start of the boom, Irish wage rates were much below U.K., French, and Ger-
man levels in both skilled and unskilled occupations, but especially in the latter. For exam-
ple, labor costs in the textile industry were lower in Britain than in Ireland in 1988, but the
differential was reversed in the computer sector (Duffy and others, 1997). The diminishing
surplus of unskilled labor and higher social welfare beneﬁts subsequently raised unskilled
wage rates, while the higher educational levels of the large cohorts leaving the educational
system and their lack of external employment opportunities may have exerted downward
pressure on skilled wage rates. On the other hand, returning migrants earned a wage pre-
mium (Barrett and O’Connell, 2000).
Figure 5. Wage Competitiveness and Total Employment, 1975–2000
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Department of Finance annual Economic Review and Outlook, various years.
a. Average of hourly earnings in Ireland’s main trading partners (expressed in a common currency) divided by earnings in Ire-
land, shown as a percentage of the 1975–87 linear trend in that ratio, which is projected forward after 1987.
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0675-01 BPEA/Honohan  7/22/02  1:15 PM  Page 21indications for other sectors suggest that the overall trends shown do not
mislead. The rapid increase in relative wages up to the mid-1980s was
interrupted and may have been reversed.
For Ireland, wage rates are preferable as a measure of competitiveness
either to consumer prices (which are affected by substantial increases in
indirect taxes not immediately relevant to international competitiveness)
or to unit labor costs (which are dramatically inﬂuenced by the shift in
sectoral composition to sectors with low labor shares).In particular, some
observers have mistakenly attempted to judge Irish labor competitiveness
by comparing average unit labor costs across industries. Such measures
are seriously misleading, exaggerating improvements in competitiveness,
because the average is improved by the shifting sectoral composition
from high- to low-labor-share technologies, even if marginal or average
labor productivity does not change in any sector. Unit labor cost data in
Ireland are further distorted by the special characteristics addressed later
in this paper. 
On the other hand, if the data could be adequately adjusted for these
sectoral shifts and other problems, they would likely show some persis-
tent differential productivity growth in Ireland’s favor. Indeed, the trend
increase in relative Irish wages in the 1970s and early 1980s was usually
interpreted as an equilibrium Balassa-Samuelson effect, that is, a reﬂec-
tion of the rise in relative wages and costs in the nontraded sector of an
economy enjoying rapid productivity growth in the export sector
(although this would not be the case for sharp runups such as that in
1976–80). 
Figure 5 represents a compromise in which the differential change in
wage rates is detrended by a constant, as if there had been a constant rate
of differential marginal productivity growth. Provocatively juxtaposed
with the employment data, the resulting wage competitiveness series sug-
gests an important causal factor in the jobs performance of the 1990s.
Later we consider the process of wage determination that gave rise to this
competitiveness improvement. 
Fiscal and Exchange Rate Policy during the Boom
Once economic activity started to pick up in the late 1980s, tax receipts
began to ﬂood in (not least the corporate tax, with the surging manufac-
turing proﬁts taxed at 10 percent), allowing the government to lower tax
22 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
0675-01 BPEA/Honohan  7/22/02  1:15 PM  Page 22rates quite sharply without any signiﬁcant decline in the share of GNP
taken in taxation (after 1990) or any increase in the deﬁcit.29 As we will
see, the ability to lower tax rates gave the government an important bar-
gaining chip in the centralized pay negotiations, potentially generating
another virtuous circle, as credible multiyear wage agreements halted the
deterioration in wage competitiveness that had been a feature of the previ-
ous ten years. 
With the ﬁscal stabilization in place and inﬂation staying low, main-
taining conﬁdence was the watchword, and attitudes toward realignments
hardened. Thus, after the departure of sterling from the exchange rate
mechanism (ERM) of the EMS in September 1992, the Irish government
resisted market pressure to devalue for over four months despite the sud-
den severe loss of cross-channel competitiveness and soaring interest
rates (ﬁgure 6). The Irish pound was eventually devalued, in February
1993, and not long thereafter the ERM effectively fell apart and members
were allowed a wide margin of ﬂuctuation. During the six years of loosely
managed ﬂoat that followed, real interest rates (and excess returns) were
lower than they had been under the ERM.
The budget also beneﬁted from the receipt of substantially expanded
structural grants from the EU budget after 1988. This came at a crucial
moment inasmuch as, using these funds, the government could begin to
tackle the backlog of deferred infrastructure projects without threatening
the initially fragile recovery in the public ﬁnances. Annual receipts from
this source peaked at over 3 percent of GNP in 1993, a very substantial
sum, although only a fraction of the ﬁscal turnaround. The wider impact
of these funds on the economy is discussed later in the paper.
Although the major contribution to demand growth in the late 1980s
and early 1990s came from net exports, attributable both to greater com-
petitiveness and to capital formation in the export sector (as discussed
below), by the mid-1990s increased prosperity and lower interest rates
were inducing higher private investment in housing. Thus, although the
ﬁscal accounts continued to strengthen until 2001, the current account,
which had been in surplus since 1992, began to deteriorate in 1998 and
moved into a small deﬁcit by 2000.
By this stage the economy was displaying unmistakable signs of over-
heating, most conspicuously in property prices: house prices rose by some
Patrick Honohan and Brendan Walsh 23
29. The role of low taxation of corporation proﬁts in boosting inward FDI is discussed
later in the paper.
0675-01 BPEA/Honohan  7/22/02  1:15 PM  Page 23120 percent between 1996 and 2000. Consumer price inﬂation accelerated
for a while, touching 7 percent in 2000 despite adoption of the euro as the
national currency.30 This inﬂation spike was largely attributable to the
appreciation of the dollar and sterling against the euro in its early months,
but local demand pressure also contributed. 
This is not the place to discuss the prospects for a successful manage-
ment of the transition from boom to more normal growth rates, although
such a transition was unmistakably under way by mid-2001. As the fol-
lowing sections will show, some of the institutional features that had
worked so well in the upturn—the pay bargaining system and the role of
24 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
30. Political arguments similar to those that had driven the Irish pound into the EMS in
1979 applied again in the decision to adopt the single currency beginning in 1999. Most
economists thought that the economic arguments for and against membership absent the
United Kingdom were fairly evenly balanced. As the start of European Monetary Union
neared, interest rates converged downward toward those in Germany, adding to the demand
pressure in the Irish housing market. In March 1998, in order to dampen inﬂationary pres-
sure, it was decided to raise the Irish pound’s entry rate by adjusting its EMS central rate.
This was the only occasion in the twenty-year history of the EMS when a member currency
was revalued against the deutsche mark. 
Figure 6. Real Interest Rate, 1983–2001a
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Central Bank of Ireland, Quarterly Bulletin, various years.
a. Quarterly average of money market rates deﬂated by the one-quarter-ahead change in the consumer price index.
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0675-01 BPEA/Honohan  7/22/02  1:15 PM  Page 24inward FDI in high-technology industries—looked by 2001 as if they
might be less benign in the downturn. Still, memories of the protracted
ﬁscal crisis of the 1970s and 1980s and of the associated economic
malaise were sufﬁciently fresh to ensure more prudent ﬁscal management
this time around. And although the recent surge in current expenditure is
disturbingly reminiscent of the mistakes of the late 1970s, in EMU at least
there is now no scope for homegrown monetary policy mistakes.
Employment and the Labor Market
Although demand management failures and the consequences of the
struggle to restore order to the public ﬁnances explain Ireland’s sluggish
employment performance during most of the 1980s, and their correction
could have been expected to result in some recovery, the rapid and sus-
tained growth in employment especially after 1989 still needs discussion.
The new jobs were sufﬁciently numerous not only to wipe out most of the
unemployment, but also to absorb an unusually high natural rate of labor
force growth,31 a sharp increase in labor force participation by women,
and considerable net immigration that reversed the traditional outﬂow.
(Figure 7 shows how these developments transformed the population
structure in favor of productive workers.) 
A high elasticity of international migration has long been a hallmark of
the Irish labor market, and indeed, the rate of unemployment is loosely
anchored to that in the United Kingdom. Net emigration has long seemed
to place a ceiling on the gap between Irish and U.K. unemployment.
Although Irish unemployment is today slightly below the U.K. rate, rather
than well above it as was the case for decades, U.K. labor market condi-
tions still appear to be the major determinant of medium-term ﬂuctuations
in Irish unemployment. With complete freedom of movement between the
two countries, and a tradition of high mobility, the U.K. labor market acts
as a ﬂywheel. When job creation was low in Ireland, net emigration even-
tually closed any wide gap between Irish and U.K. unemployment rates.
(Although the gap jumped to almost 9 percentage points in 1989, this was
transitory.) Assisted by the more rapid job creation of recent years, Irish
unemployment has dipped close even to what have been historically low
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31. This in turn resulted from a baby bulge, which has now matured, the birth rate hav-
ing declined precipitously after 1980.
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Figure 7. Characteristics of Population and Employment, 1961–2001
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downturn had not intervened.
Econometric analysis of these relations, although not conclusive, cor-
roborates these general assertions (table 4). Even without the change in
employment, or the wage variables as additional explanatory variables, an
error correction model in which U.K. unemployment is the only driver
provides quite a good ﬁt, although the large positive autocorrelation coef-
ﬁcient clearly ﬂags the omission of one or more slow-moving explanatory
variables (regression equations 4-1 and 4-2).32 Omission of the change in
employment makes it hard for the equation to match the actual amplitude
of the major ﬂuctuation.
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32. Although lack of cointegration between U.K. and Irish unemployment rates cannot
be rejected, when the percentage change in total Irish employment is included, a three-
variable cointegrating relationship—Johansen’s test—is obtained. However, the coefﬁcient
on the employment change term is rather high, and we prefer to present the results based on
using the change in employment as a transitory term as above.
Figure 7. Characteristics of Population and Employment, 1961–2001 (continued)
Source: Central Statistics Ofﬁce Ireland, Demography and Labour Force data.
a. Annual averages.
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unemployment in the late 1990s would have exerted its traditional down-
ward pressure on the Irish rate, but through the usual outﬂow of emigrants
and the stagnation of nonagricultural employment. Instead, the effects of
higher unemployment and centralized wage bargaining on wage inﬂation
spurred job creation, which not only reduced Irish unemployment but also
sucked in Irish emigrants from abroad, young workers from elsewhere in
the European Union, and a modest, although much remarked upon, ﬂow
of economic migrants and asylum seekers from Eastern Europe and the
developing world. 
As argued above, wage restraint has been a hallmark of the recovery.
This is partly attributable to the high levels of unemployment that had
been reached in Ireland and the United Kingdom, partly to union restraint
exercised in the process of centralized pay agreements (associated with
tax reductions), and partly, perhaps, to reduced union power in much of
the economy. This last topic deserves an explicit discussion, to which we
now turn.
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Figure 8. Irish and U.K. Unemployment, 1960–2001
Source: ESRI database.
a. Measured by the ILO deﬁnition.
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One helpful way of thinking about Ireland’s distinctive industrial rela-
tions and wage bargaining arrangements is to recognize how sharply they
have diverged in the past two decades from those in Britain. Both
economies have recovered from severe and protracted episodes of mass
unemployment, but they have chosen dramatically different routes out of
their crises. In Britain the power of the trade and labor unions was under-
mined in the 1980s by confrontations with the government, such as that
which crushed the mineworkers’ strike in 1984, and subsequent legisla-
tive changes. But in Ireland there was no explicit government agenda to
curb union power; on the contrary, the role of unions was greatly strength-
ened by the revival and deepening, beginning in 1987, of a centralized
bargaining process that went beyond wages to cover taxation and other
aspects of economic policy.
To be sure, the disastrous labor market trends of the 1980s had hit the
Irish trade union movement very hard. Union membership, which had
been growing rapidly since the 1960s, peaked in 1980 and declined
steadily until the 1990s. Union density declined even more rapidly and
did not recover (ﬁgure 9), as most of the new jobs created in the booming
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Table 4. Regressions Linking Irish and U.K. Unemployment Using an Error
Correction Modela
Independent variable 4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4
Constant 1.04 1.24 2.31 2.20
(6.6) (6.3) (2.3) (1.6)
First difference of U.K.  0.50 0.47 0.59 0.63
unemployment (7.1) (6.4) (4.1) (3.4)
First difference of Irish  –0.37 –0.37
employment (11.7) (11.5)
Lagged difference between  –0.08 –0.10 –0.67 0.59
Irish and U.K. unemployment (2.3) (2.8) (3.6) (2.2)
First-order autocorrelation  –0.26 –0.33 0.86 0.84
coefﬁcient (1.5) (1.6) (6.5) (4.1)
Summary statistic
R2 0.877 0.899 0.578 0.621
Durbin-Watson 2.05 2.08 2.16 2.20
Sample period 1964–2000 1973–2000 1957–2000 1973–2000
Source: Authors’ regressions based on data from the ESRI database.
a. The dependent variable is the ﬁrst difference of Irish unemployment. Variables for employment and unemployment are
expressed as a percentage of the labor force. t statistics are reported in parentheses.
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would have been anxious to bolster their power through corporatist insti-
tutions; it is less easy to see why the authorities would have wanted to
revert to this “partnership approach” to wage bargaining in the late 1980s,
which had been abandoned as a failure just a few years before.
It was against a historical background of poor industrial relations that
centralized wage bargaining had begun decades before, with an attempt to
achieve a more “orderly” development of “wage rounds,” that is, pay
increases negotiated between employers and unions. Initially the central
agreements were conﬁned to the nitty-gritty of percentage pay increases,
the treatment of lower-paid workers, cost-of-living adjustments, and
mechanisms for resolving disputes, with the government participating
mainly as an employer. But in 1976 the government, inﬂuenced by the
successful experience of such countries as Austria, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, and Sweden, sought an integrated pay agreement, linked to changes
in social welfare beneﬁts, and accepted some responsibility for job cre-
ation in return for pay moderation. Implicitly, the goal was to move Ire-
30 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
Figure 9. Membership in Trade Unions, 1960–97
Source: ESRI database.
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explaining excess wage inﬂation as a function of the degree of centraliza-
tion in wage bargaining.33 In contrast, Mrs. Thatcher was soon to move
Britain to the right.
But the 1979 National Understanding for Economic and Social Devel-
opment, negotiated against a backdrop of disastrous industrial strife,
embodied the government’s expansionist approach and provided signiﬁ-
cant wage concessions. Although this agreement achieved a reduction in
the level of strikes, a second agreement collapsed in 1982, and there fol-
lowed a ﬁve-year period of decentralized collective bargaining.34
It was not until 1987, at the depth of the crisis, that a new centralized
agreement was negotiated. This came about in very altered circumstances,
with much-weakened unions and a widespread consensus that generalized
belt tightening was needed to reverse the economic decline. This agree-
ment was followed by four others, negotiated over successive three- to
four-year horizons extending from 1988 to 2003, each exceeding the
previous one in its ambition and scope. The range of objectives now
extended far beyond the basic goal of promoting industrial peace and
keeping the economy competitive to objectives such as “bringing about a
fairer and more inclusive Ireland” and “promoting an entrepreneurial
culture.” 
Impact of Centralized Agreements
Admirers of the partnership approach, with its use of a broad, tax-
based incomes policy, give it much credit for contributing to the excep-
tional growth in employment by almost eliminating industrial disputes
and moderating real wage growth. 
STRIKES. A comparison of the Irish and British records on industrial
disputes is instructive (ﬁgure 10). The Irish strike rate was similar to the
British rate in the 1970s. There was a dramatic spike in 1979 related to a
national postal strike. This concentrated minds on the need to promote
industrial peace. The strike rate fell to a much lower level after the new
wage bargaining system was launched in 1987, and during the 1990s
strikes ceased to be a general problem. The U.K. experience was broadly
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and a rate of virtually zero in the 1990s. Thus the Irish and British records
might be viewed as separate paths to the same destination.
Employers welcomed the outbreak of industrial peace and the saving
of time and energy at the level of the ﬁrm achieved by the centralization
and coordination of wage bargaining. It is interesting to note that the afﬁl-
iates of U.S. ﬁrms in Ireland thrived in a setting of centralized pay
bargaining completely alien to their domestic industrial relations environ-
ment. Many now managed to combine the corporatist approach at the
national level with a union-free workplace. Up until the early 1980s, most
multinational corporations (MNCs) had accepted the presence of unions
as a matter of course; that this stopped being the convention is another
reﬂection of the weakness of unions, and of the unemployment situation,
in the mid-1980s.
Of course, the centralized route relies on continuous effort to maintain
the consensus. Memories of the bad times fade, and there is already some
indication in the last few years of an uptick in Irish trade union militancy.
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Figure 10. Days Lost to Industrial Disputes in Ireland and the United Kingdom,
1960–2000
Sources: Central Statistics Ofﬁce Ireland, Industrial Disputes, various issues; and United Kingdom Ofﬁce for National Statis-
tics, Annual Abstract of Statistics, various years.
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public sector or state-owned industries. This underscores the fact that the
less confrontational Irish approach to the industrial strife of the 1970s and
1980s did not dislodge the trade union movement from a central role in
pay bargaining or reduce its legal prerogatives. Meanwhile the drive to
privatize the state-owned industries, where unions continue to exercise
considerable insider power, has been half-hearted, compared with what
has been done in Britain. 
REAL WAGES AND COMPETITIVENESS. Several authors have analyzed
why the upward relative trend of Irish wages was halted in 1986, but the
underlying factors have proved resistant to an agreed econometric expla-
nation. Much of the short-term ﬂuctuation in the relative position is attrib-
utable to autonomous exchange rate changes involving sterling and the
dollar. Indeed, once these are allowed for, it is hard to identify a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant role for the domestic unemployment rate, let alone the
pay bargaining regime.35 But exchange rate movements are implausible as
an underlying cause of the sustained reversal of trend. How much of this
should be attributed to the new pay negotiation environment? Despite the
inconclusive econometric results, most observers regard the coincidence
of timing of the reversal of the deteriorating trend in competitiveness with
the new approach to pay bargaining as suggestive that the latter did pay
dividends. 
A key feature of the agreements was the lowering of the burden of
taxation on employees; this was held to be crucial to the moderation of
nominal wage claims. Indeed, crudely plotting the overall share of taxa-
tion in GNP in figure 3 against the wage competitiveness measure in fig-
ure 5 produces a temptingly close fit (not shown).36 Thus the reductions
in tax rates, already discussed above, were an implicit part of the negoti-
ation of each agreement, with government promising income tax “con-
cessions” in return for pay moderation. Along with the rapidly falling
top marginal tax rates, mentioned earlier, income tax thresholds were
raised sharply in real terms, taking more and more of the lower paid out
of the income tax net.
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35. Curtis and FitzGerald (1996); Walsh (2000).
36. An R2 of 0.91 is obtained with just the tax variable, lagged two years (t statistic
of 7), and a linear time trend. Here again, however, we need to be cautious: as has been
noted, the twenty-six years of data represents only one cycle.
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of tax rates had a natural limit inﬂuenced by public perceptions of the ade-
quacy of the provision of public services. The time would eventually
come when the government would have nothing more to offer in this
dimension to buy wage moderation. Indeed, targeted improvements to
public services became part of the pay bargains.
Was there a price paid in terms of inequality? Naïve calculations sug-
gest a huge increase in the share of proﬁts in GDP, but, for reasons dis-
cussed in the next section relating to the interpretation of the proﬁts of
MNCs, it is hard to be precise about the extent to which wage restraint
really did shift relative factor shares.37 Certainly the boom has brought
about a large reduction in absolute income poverty and in nonmonetary
measures of deprivation, but there has been no clear trend in relative
poverty or in inequality.38
By 1998 there was considerable drift in actual private sector wage rates
above what was agreed in the national agreements. The era of wage
restraint seemed to be nearing its end. Fortuitously, however, the weak-
ness of the euro between 1999 and 2002 helped keep Irish labor competi-
tive despite accelerating nominal wage increases, as ﬁgure 5 showed.
Structural Rigidities
Conventional wisdom (repeated in many reports of the OECD and the
European Commission) has it that the poor labor market performance of
the continental European economies may be partly blamed on rigidities
and structural defects in their labor markets. It is widely believed that the
interaction of the tax and beneﬁt systems creates serious disincentives to
offering and accepting employment. It is thus worth examining whether,
aside from the lower tax rates, policy changes of the type advocated by
the OECD played a signiﬁcant role in the transformation of the Irish labor
market during the 1990s. 
The simplest summary of the impact of the beneﬁt system on work
incentives is the replacement ratio, the proportion of the net-of-tax wage
income that is replaced by unemployment beneﬁts in various situations.
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37. Even after excluding MNC proﬁts, the wage share in factor income has been
declining since the mid-1990s, but only slightly, for example from 64.7 percent in 1994 to
62.8 percent in 1999 (Lane, 1997).
38. Nolan, O’Connell, and Whelan (2000).
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during the 1970s, the relative generosity of Irish beneﬁts increased from a
low initial level, reached a plateau in the mid-1980s, and declined gently
thereafter, as ﬁgure 3 showed. Ireland is close to the OECD average on
this index, above countries like the United States but signiﬁcantly below
the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries.39 There was no radical
reform of the Irish welfare system during the 1990s to which the dramatic
improvement of the labor market can be attributed. 
But the interactions between social welfare beneﬁts and net-of-tax
earnings from employment are complex and not fully captured by the
replacement ratio. Some subtle changes were made to the structure of the
Irish entitlements system that increased the incentives to take paid
employment. An example is the decision in 1999 to allow those enrolling
in back-to-work or training schemes to continue to receive rent and mort-
gage supplements. Still, such changes were relatively minor and occurred
after the unemployment rate had begun to fall rapidly. 
Others point to the carrot-and-stick approach taken to encourage job
search and participation in education and training programs. OECD data
reveal that Ireland moved well up the national rankings on spending on
such active labor market policies between 1985 and 1997: this spending
rose from 14 percent of average industrial earnings per person unem-
ployed in 1985 to 29 percent in 1997, when only the Netherlands and the
Scandinavian countries reported higher ﬁgures. This level of spending has
proved controversial, and although there is some microeconometric evi-
dence to suggest that the increased emphasis on “back to work” measures
did help a little in improving the functioning of the labor market in the
1990s, its role should not be exaggerated.40
The disincentive effects of these generous beneﬁts appear small com-
pared with those reported in the international literature—elasticities of
duration with respect to beneﬁts of only 0.01—and the largest effects are
reported among relatively advantaged unemployed groups, and not the
long-term unemployed who constitute such a large proportion of the core
unemployment problem in Europe.41 It is all the more remarkable, then,
that the long-term unemployment rate was even more responsive than the
overall rate to the employment boom, falling from almost 11 percent in
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due to reassigning chronic unemployed persons to out-of-labor-force cat-
egories, including work on special (“community employment”) schemes. 
Where Did All the Jobs Come From?
During the dark days of the long 1980s, pessimists would raise the
unanswerable question: Where will all the jobs needed to achieve full
employment come from? The lack of a convincing ex ante answer to this
question was used to advocate a major expansion of public sector employ-
ment. In the event, it was after the emphasis on public sector employment
was abandoned that jobs were generated at an unprecedented rate. 
Table 5 shows how the employment gain was distributed across sec-
tors. The predominance of the so-called market services sector as a
provider of new jobs is striking. This heterogeneous category ranges from
ﬁnancial services (banks, insurance companies, and the like), legal ser-
vices, and accountancy ﬁrms to hotels, catering, restaurants, and pubs. It
includes employment in what might be regarded as economic base activi-
ties (such as tourism and internationally traded ﬁnancial services) as well
as “induced” activities (such as local commercial services). Employment
in the publicly ﬁnanced health and educational services also increased
quite rapidly, but the numbers in core public administration were
contained. 
Export-driven manufacturing has been a particular strength, with the
numbers employed growing against the trend of the OECD countries
generally. Most of this expansion occurred in newer industries such as
electronics, pharmaceuticals, and medical instrumentation, where
foreign-owned ﬁrms account for over 90 percent of output (the peculiar-
ities of these industries are discussed in the next section). Employment in
traditional industries—which include clothing, textiles, furniture, and
utilities, where established Irish ﬁrms predominate—was more or less
static over the period. But by 2000 manufacturing as a whole accounted
for only 18 percent of total employment, of which foreign-owned firms
contributed about half. Even if a generous allowance is made for the
employment indirectly generated by these ﬁrms, their contribution to
total employment remains small, whatever their wider contribution to the
economy (to which we turn in the next section). 
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Ireland’s high labor force elasticity is no mystery, especially when the
size and openness of the economy are recalled. High initial unemploy-
ment, an exceptional gap between Irish and U.K. unemployment rates,
low initial participation rates, and a baby bulge endowed with high educa-
tional qualiﬁcations entering the labor force ensured that there would be
no difﬁculty in ﬁlling a large number of newly created jobs.42 The differ-
ence was that in the 1990s these preconditions were actually used to cre-
ate an employment miracle.
This miracle owes something to a more cooperative approach among
the social partners—labor, management, and government—than had been
achieved at any time in the past. The key to this outbreak of harmony was
the weakening of the trade union movement by the devastating job losses
and soaring unemployment of the early 1980s. Faced with a dismal situa-
tion in the mid-1980s, the government decided to adopt a conciliatory
approach rather than imitate the confrontational Thatcherite strategy.
Patrick Honohan and Brendan Walsh 37
42. The availability of labor was one of the attractions to FDI, and its quality inﬂu-
enced which industries were attracted.
Table 5. Employment Growth by Sector, 1985–2000 
Percent
Average  
Share of   annual growth Share of total Share of
1985 rate of  increase in 2000 
Sector employment employment employment employment
Agriculture 15.1 –1.8 –7.3 7.9
Building and 
construction 6.6 5.4 16.4 10.2
Manufacturing 19.8 2.4 15.9 18.0
Traditional 12.5 0.2 0.6 9.0
High technologya 7.3 4.6 13.1 9.0
Market services 36.9 3.8 54.1 42.4
Nonmarket servicesb 21.4 2.9 22.4 21.5
Total 100.0 2.7 100.0 100.0
Source: ESRI database.
a. Approximated by the chemicals and electronics industries.
b. Includes industries such as health services, education, and public administration.
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enced the new social partnership approach, which achieved industrial
peace as well as moderation in nominal and real wage claims in exchange
for tax cuts, social welfare improvements, and a growing list of govern-
ment commitments on other fronts. 
The cuts in income tax rates helped moderate the rate of inﬂation in
wage costs, improved the competitiveness of labor, and created the condi-
tions conducive for investment by domestic and foreign entrepreneurs.
This led to the creation of employment on an unprecedented scale, not
only in the services sector, but even in the manufacturing sector, where
foreign-owned ﬁrms led the way, and eventually—very strongly—in the
building industry as the boom matured. Some reduction in disincentives
to employment arising from the social welfare and tax systems, and an
increased emphasis on active labor market measures, helped the labor
market to function more smoothly, but these measures were secondary. 
Output Growth and Productivity
Previous sections have, we hope, managed to explain and interpret
much of the essence of the Irish economic miracle of the last ﬁfteen years
without mentioning some of the most distinctive elements revealed by
even a cursory examination of Irish economic statistics, namely, the
extremely high degree of trade openness, the large share of foreign-
owned ﬁrms in manufacturing, and the high level and recent high growth
rate of apparent labor productivity.
All three of these characteristics are interrelated. A very high propor-
tion of Irish trade (over 90 percent of manufacturing exports, and almost
80 percent of all exports) reﬂects the output of foreign-owned manufac-
turing enterprises. And the level and growth rate of productivity have been
much higher in industries dominated by these ﬁrms. This is not, as some
skeptics have believed, a mirage; the numbers are correctly recorded. But
although productivity has been high and the role of foreign ﬁrms impor-
tant, a simplistic reading of the numbers can greatly overstate their contri-
bution to the Irish boom. This section seeks to explain why this is so,
thereby resolving one of the puzzles of the Irish story: how such rapid
measured productivity and aggregate output growth could have been
achieved during the 1990s.
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Ireland was recently rated ﬁrst in the world in Foreign Policy maga-
zine’s globalization ranking.43 One aspect of globalization is the ratio of
trade (exports plus imports) to GDP, which in 2000 was 173 percent, a
ﬁgure approached only by Singapore. This particular comparison alerts us
to the near-entrepôt character of a segment of MNC manufacturing in Ire-
land. Probing deeper, we ﬁnd that a handful of industries, employing just
a small fraction of the manufacturing work force (and much less of total
employment), accounts for a very large share not only of economy-wide
exports but also of imports, output, and proﬁts and makes a dispropor-
tionate contribution to measured aggregate productivity.44
To take the most extreme case identified in the official statistics, just
two dozen enterprises manufacturing goods classified as “other organic
basic chemicals” (NACE code 24.14)45 and employing 4,800 workers, or
just 0.3 percent of economy-wide employment, produced over 18 per-
cent of the economy’s total exports in 1999, a sum equivalent to 14 per-
cent of GDP. Even after subtracting the very substantial import
component, the value added of this four-digit industry, which produces
various pharmaceutical-related chemicals, accounted for 8
1⁄2 percent of
GDP. But what are we to make of an industry where the share of labor in
net output is as low as 1.7 percent, and where net output per worker has
been as high as $2
1⁄2 million, or 1.8 million Irish pounds (in 1998)? 
Several other industries also display a strikingly low labor share (see
the appendix). It is not hard to ﬁgure out what is going on when we look
at the industries involved: for example, the “other food products” cate-
gory is dominated by a few large soft-drink concentrate producers;
“reproduction of recorded media” includes the manufacture of software
packages such as Microsoft Windows. It is not that these are capital-
intensive industries—all are estimated to have annual real returns on cap-
ital invested in excess of 100 percent.46 Instead, these are all industries
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44. An alternative way of characterizing the impact of the largest MNCs is presented
by Keating (2000), who estimates that they directly accounted for 10 billion out of a 1998
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45. NACE is the European standard statistical classiﬁcation of economic activities.
46. Updated from Honohan, Maître, and Conroy (1998).
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and development that went into producing these goods was conducted in
afﬁliates of these enterprises in other countries, mainly the United States.
Much of the proﬁt, however, is located in Ireland, a natural consequence
of the low corporate proﬁts tax rate that has prevailed there for such busi-
ness, one way or another, for the past half-century. Until 1979 the major
concession was the exemption of proﬁts derived from exports from
corporate and personal income tax. Thereafter, in order to come into com-
pliance with EU requirements of nondiscrimination as between produc-
tion for the domestic market and that for exports to other EU states, the
exemption was replaced by a preferential 10 percent corporate tax rate
applied to manufacturing and certain internationally traded services.
Recently, this concession came under pressure from the European Com-
mission, leading to a decision to unify the corporate tax rate economy-
wide at 12
1⁄2 percent beginning in 2003.
Ireland’s long-standing and enthusiastic encouragement of inward FDI
includes not only low corporate proﬁt tax rates but also an element of
grant assistance, freedom to repatriate proﬁts, and an energetic industrial
promotion agency. But it is notable that a disproportionate share of the
ﬁrms attracted by this package has come from industries well placed to
take advantage of legitimate tax management within the standard transfer
pricing rules.
In effect, since Ireland has by far the lowest standard rate of corporate
tax on manufacturing among the advanced economies, these transactions
are often booked at transfer prices that have the effect of locating a very
high fraction of the enterprise’s global proﬁts in Ireland. The pricing of
such speciﬁc inputs and outputs, many of them traded with afﬁliates,
although governed by rules established by tax authorities, is somewhat
arbitrary.47 What is clear is that, in many cases, the huge proﬁts recorded
by the Irish afﬁliates have very little to do with the manufacturing activi-
ties being conducted in Ireland. The low labor shares in value added
should not be interpreted as truly implying high economic productivity of
the labor and physical capital employed by the enterprises in Ireland.
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here that the U.S. taxpayer does not necessarily bear the incidence of this use of the Irish
tax regime by U.S. MNCs, which mainly affects where overseas investment is located. 
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sectoral production statistics. The numbers involved are large and have
been growing relative to the total economy, and so they affect growth
rates as well as levels. As one rough indication of the scale of the prob-
lem, aggregate GDP in 1999 would be more than 15 percent lower if the
output of just the four industries discussed in the appendix were repriced
at “shadow” prices chosen to make the reestimated apparent labor pro-
ductivity equal to the mean for corresponding industries in other Euro-
pean countries. At these shadow prices, aggregate exports would be
27 percent lower and aggregate industrial production 52 percent lower.
The growth rate of GDP would also be lower, as discussed below.
Obviously, this is a very crude adjustment to the data. For one thing, it
does not cover all of the industries to which the issue is relevant. On the
other hand, it may err on the conservative side by making no allowance
for any special attributes of these industries in Ireland, such as the recent
vintage of their physical capital and their favorable product mix. Because
of the scale and complexity of this transfer pricing issue, it bedevils
aggregate economic analysis. Cross-national analyses of output, produc-
tivity, proﬁt shares, and geographical trade patterns, for example, are
strongly inﬂuenced by how transfer pricing is treated.48 Unfortunately,
however, this aspect is all too often neglected. 
Even after adjustments such as the one offered above, the contribution
of MNCs to the economy is very large. For example, just under 50 per-
cent of manufacturing employment is in foreign-owned firms, and even
at the low tax rate, corporate tax revenue from manufacturing and inter-
nationally traded service companies yields almost 7 percent of total tax
revenue. Although direct industrial and service linkages are relatively
modest (input-output-based calculations suggest that each manufacturing
job is associated with one other job in the economy delivering inputs to
the manufacturer),49 it is generally accepted that these firms have, over
the years, brought management practices and skills that have since perco-
lated widely throughout the economy. It may also be that reliance on tax
incentives, which resulted in self-selection by firms with increasing
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48. That the share of the United States in Irish exports jumped from 11.2 percent in
1997 to 17.2 percent in 2000 was partly due to exchange rate movements, but more impor-
tantly to the surge in exports of chemicals, notably including Viagra.
49. O’Malley (1995).
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capital, helped to tilt Irish manufacturing toward higher-growth indus-
tries. This, of course, was also a goal of the industrial promotion agen-
cies, which claim success in picking winning industries. Whatever the
cause, the indications are that Ireland was already capturing an increased
share of the stock of U.S. manufacturing FDI into Europe back in the late
1970s (figure 11).50
Explicit mention should also be made of the International Financial
Service Centre (IFSC) in Dublin. In this rejuvenated and rebuilt zone of
what had been a disused part of the capital’s inner-city docklands, ﬁrms
offering approved international ﬁnancial services to nonresidents of Ire-
land enjoyed broadly similar corporate tax concessions, together with
relief from property taxes beginning in 1988, until, under pressure from
the European Commission, the concessions were withdrawn for new start-
ups after 1999. By 2001 the ofﬁcial ﬁgure for employment creation at the
IFSC had risen to 11,000, which corresponds to a quarter of total ﬁnancial
sector employment in Ireland. There could, however, be some debate
about the extent to which this employment is truly additional, as Irish
banks have moved substantial parts of their operations physically into the
IFSC, in order to be able to claim the low rate of tax on their nonresident
business. On the other hand, the IFSC’s boast of considerable comple-
mentary factor employment outside the IFSC itself is not an empty one.
Productivity and Real Income Growth
Recognizing, then, the need for caution in employing unadjusted out-
put ﬁgures for productivity analysis, and that data problems have ham-
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50. Plotting Ireland’s share of the ﬂow rather than the stock of U.S. outward FDI (as, for
example, in Duffy and others, 2001) does tend to make Ireland’s relative performance in
attracting FDI in the 1990s look stronger. It is also important to distinguish between manu-
facturing and total FDI; the latter includes an important element of ﬁnancial services invest-
ment that has greatly increased, especially since 1998. Recorded average ﬂows of inward
FDI from all sources were equivalent to 8 percent of domestic ﬁxed capital formation dur-
ing 1985–95; this is perhaps an underestimate, but it serves to emphasize the intangible
nature of the intellectual capital actually being employed. There is little correspondence
between the value of FDI ﬂows and the value of real capital formation in Ireland by invest-
ing ﬁrms. By 2000 the ﬂow had jumped to almost 100 percent of domestic ﬁxed capital for-
mation, much of it in the ﬁnancial sector and intended for use in outward portfolio
investment through the International Financial Service Centre (see text). Finally, the late
1990s also saw a sharp increase in outward FDI.
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need to provide a balanced summary of aggregate income and productiv-
ity growth during the boom years. Figure 12 shows three different mea-
sures of average living standards during the past twenty-ﬁve years: GNP,
gross national disposable income (GNDI), and consumption (all per
capita). Figure 13 shows three measures of productivity growth (each of
which is a measure of output growth divided by the relevant employment
ﬁgure). Each of the six series tells a distinct part of the story. The use of
GNP rather than GDP in ﬁgure 12 is important: the difference between
them has long been greater in Ireland than in any other industrial country.
For most countries it makes little difference which measure is used, and
GDP is the market leader. For Ireland, however, unadjusted GDP is
arguably too misleading to be used in most contexts, and one or another of
the adjusted series is preferable, depending on the context. GDP has been
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Figure 11. Ireland’s Share of the Stock of U.S. Manufacturing FDI in the European
Union, 1966–99a
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, direct investment Financial and Operating data, and Balance of Payments and Direct
Investment Position data.
a. Two distinctly different series are combined to provide a continuous measure. For 1996–94, data are the percentage of the
assets of U.S. ﬁrms’ foreign afﬁliates funded by their parent, from BEA direct investment Financial and Operating data. For
1994–99, data are the cumulative value of U.S. parent ﬁrms’ investments in their afﬁliates, from BEA Balance of Payments and
Direct Investment Position data. Because these data show a larger stock of FDI in the overlap year, 1994, than in the ﬁrst series, the
combined series shown here takes the level of FDI in 1994 from the ﬁrst series and, starting with 1995, increases it by the percent-
age change observed for the second series. * indicates missing observation.
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payments to foreign creditors (resulting from the size of government for-
eign debt, especially in the 1980s), but more the large share in GDP—
reaching as high as 24 percent in 2000 if the IFSC is included, and
20 percent for manufacturing alone—accounted for by the proﬁts of
foreign-owned  ﬁrms operating in Ireland.51 Growth of GDP has been
faster than GNP: by 1
1⁄4 percentage points on average in the late 1990s.
The second living standards measure, GNDI adjusted for the terms of
trade, differs from GNP by adding net current transfers from abroad,
mainly from the structural funds of the European Union, as well as by
adjusting for terms-of-trade effects, which have tended to be adverse in
recent years.52
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51. Note, however, that recent years have also seen sizable proﬁt inﬂows attributable to
a growing gross outward ﬂow of FDI. 
52. Buffeted by international developments common to other oil-importing industrial
countries, Ireland’s terms of trade have also displayed a trend weakness since the mid-
1980s. Part of this may be attributed to rapid price decline due to the short product cycle
characteristic of the computer and software industry. Chain-weighted indexes have not yet
Figure 12. Growth in Measures of Living Standards, 1975–2000a
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from Central Statistics Ofﬁce Ireland, National Income and Expenditure; and
ESRI database.
a. All measures are per capita.
b. Adjusted for terms of trade.
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more moderate than growth in aggregate income. The government
absorbed much of the difference and applied it to debt reduction—an
approach that tended at ﬁrst to conceal the extent of the boom from the
general public.
For productivity comparisons, ﬁgure 13 shows calculations based on
GDP per worker and two adjusted measures that exclude all MNC prof-
its.53 This adjustment is even cruder than the adjustment made in the
appendix but is available for a longer period. It is clearly conceptually an
overadjustment, but not a large one, and preferable to simply using GNP
to correct for the transfer pricing problem, because that does not allow for
the complication of the rise and fall in net interest payments on govern-
ment debt.
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been employed to alleviate this problem. A further adjustment, not made here, would add
net capital transfers from abroad.
53. With fewer farmers and more women in the labor force, hours worked have
declined by 15 percent since the 1980s. Productivity growth is higher when this is taken
into account. 
Figure 13. Alternative Measures of Productivity Growth, 1975–2000a
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from Central Statistics Ofﬁce Ireland, National Income and Expenditure; and
ESRI database.
a. All measures are per worker.
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adjusted GDP per capita converges on the EU and OECD averages (not
shown), rather than overshooting sharply. Depending on the adjustment,
Ireland’s ranking falls quite a few notches. Growth in apparent labor pro-
ductivity, as adjusted, is now within the range exhibited by other coun-
tries and by Ireland itself in earlier periods. Nevertheless, it has been
sufficient, when applied to the rapidly increasing share of workers in the
population, to generate the observed convergence in living standards.
To keep the story simple, we have said little about physical capital for-
mation, because we do not see this as a central part of the story behind the
boom. Although (for reasons by now evident) making credible calcula-
tions of total factor productivity is problematic, it would be very hard to
argue that physical capital formation was a major growth driver. Indeed,
having touched 30 percent of GDP in 1979,54 gross domestic capital for-
mation declined sharply, averaging only 17 percent of GDP during the
recovery period 1986–95 (ﬁgure 14). Much of the decline was due to the
shrinking importance of the public capital program, which fell by almost
4 percentage points of GDP between 1981 and 1990, whereas the recov-
ery in the second half of the 1990s was largely due to a resurgence of
investment in housing; the ratios to GNP are, of course, higher. Even in
1996–2000, although high by European standards, Ireland’s investment
ratio was well below the ﬁgures recorded by the other rapidly expanding
economies of the 1990s, in the Far East. Furthermore, less than one-sev-
enth of the total was attributable to manufacturing. 
Lessons and Conclusion
We have argued that the outstanding performance of the Irish economy
in the past decade or so should be interpreted mainly as a delayed struc-
tural transformation as the proportion of the population at work outside
agriculture, and the productivity of those workers, at last spurted toward
the levels long ago achieved in other industrialized countries, while the
productivity of the labor force remaining in agriculture also rose. This
46 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
54. This ﬁgure was boosted by what by all accounts proved to be relatively unproduc-
tive public investment, although the modernization of the telephone system and electricity
generation capacity, for example, in these years did not go amiss.
0675-01 BPEA/Honohan  7/22/02  1:15 PM  Page 46interpretation implies that underlying institutional preconditions for
reaching this frontier were in place but that its achievement was delayed
by macroeconomic policy errors.
Journalistic commentators have sought to identify a single explana-
tion—a secret ingredient in the hare’s diet, such as a particular policy
measure or development—that was the key to a turnaround in Irish per-
formance. The arguments of these authors are not without merit, but in
our view none of the supposed ingredients bears scrutiny as the unique
decisive factor, and as such, a lesson to be applied elsewhere. The various
ingredients fall into three categories. First are those that prove on exami-
nation to have been simmering away on the back burner for decades.
These contributed to the improved performance over the long run and cer-
tainly formed an important part of the underlying policy environment, but
they did not change much during the period of turnaround, and so they
cannot explain the “miracle” of the last decade. Second are ingredients
that, although useful, fail in quantitative terms: their direct contribution
cannot plausibly account for a major part of the gain in output, although
they may have played an important catalytic role at the moment of turn-
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Figure 14. Composition of Gross Domestic Capital Formation, 1975–2000
Sources: Central Statistics Ofﬁce Ireland, National Income and Expenditure; and ESRI database.
a. Includes industries such as health services, education, and public administration.
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terization; as such we see them not as special ingredients but as the
removal of obstacles. The unavoidably mundane conclusion is that all of
these ingredients have played their part, and thus that improved economic
performance requires a strong policy environment on a broad front. 
Slowly Simmering Ingredients
The much-vaunted quality of Irish education, contributing to the
employability of the young work force, is a key slow burner. The acceler-
ation in the growth of the average educational attainment of the work
force dates to the introduction in 1967 of universal access to secondary
education free of fees. There is no signiﬁcant inﬂection point in the 1980s.
Applying the estimated wage gradient to educational attainment suggests
that this factor contributed almost 1 percentage point to the annual growth
of GNP in the 1980s and 1990s.55
A second factor that has also been steadily at work since the early
1970s is the fall in age dependency, documented above. Almost one-third
of the population was under the age of 15 in 1971. As the birth rate belat-
edly declined toward the European average, this proportion began to fall
in the 1980s to about 21 percent in 2001, while the share of the elderly in
the population remained unchanged. 
Lower age dependency eased pressures on the public ﬁnances, while
the demographic momentum attributable to the high birth rate of the
1970s contributed to the elasticity of the labor supply. Of course, these
demographic trends were not wholly exogenous to the improved employ-
ment conditions, as witness the reversal of net emigration. Even the fall in
the birth rate could be attributed in part to the rise in women’s educational
attainment and labor force participation rates.
We have already explained that tax concessions for exporting manu-
facturers have become less rather than more generous since the late
1970s. Although unfavorable ﬁscal and other developments limited their
attractiveness until the late 1980s, their continued liberality is obviously
an important but slowly simmering element of the environment.
48 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
55. Durkan, FitzGerald, and Harmon (1999); Denny, Harmon, and Redmond (1999);
Duffy and others (2001).
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studies, include the effectiveness of deep underlying institutions such as
those related to the rule of law, the quality of public administration, and
the depth and efﬁciency of the ﬁnancial system. By comparison with
many less developed countries, the essentials in this regard were arguably
present in Ireland from an early date. For instance, Ireland scores high on
most of the subjective indicators of institutional quality employed by
growth researchers. As another example, the underlying soundness of the
ﬁnancial system (seen in the literature as a key to sustained growth) is
reﬂected in the fact that, unlike so many other countries, and despite the
severity of the long recession, Ireland escaped an extensive banking crisis
in the 1970s and the 1980s.56 An alternative crude, and somewhat quix-
otic, indicator of the basic efﬁciency of the public services was their abil-
ity to collect well over 40 percent of GNP in tax revenue. Of course, some
long-standing institutions had become dysfunctional or sclerotic, and
there have been many important institutional changes during the past two
decades; our claim here is the limited one that the Ireland of the early
1970s already enjoyed to a reasonable extent what are typically regarded
in the growth literature as the underlying institutional essentials. (Obvious
exceptions were whatever ﬂaws in political institutions of the 1970s con-
tributed to the policy errors that we have discussed.)
Finally, under this heading can also be mentioned the catchall heading
of cultural factors, whose contribution we have no good methodology for
measuring. The familiarity to American investors of Ireland’s dominant
language and of its legal and administrative systems, as well as its Janus-
like orientation to both Europe and North America, may be cited as attrac-
tions. But if culture was important, it must have been in its ability to react
to changed circumstances. The interaction of culturally determined apti-
tudes with changing technology is one possibility that has already been
mentioned. If working with computer-based or communications-intensive
technology is a culturally determined comparative advantage of the Irish,
this may help explain the speedy convergence once other barriers were
removed. It might also be related to the ﬁndings of recent happiness sur-
veys, where Ireland tends to score very high: top of the list, for example,
in a 1998 survey of workers from thirty-two countries. Is this cause, or
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explain happiness and job satisfaction with objective economic condi-
tions still leave Ireland with the largest positive residual.57
Catalytic Factors
Among the suggested ingredients whose timing is correct, and which
thus no doubt contributed to the turnaround and perhaps conveyed a cat-
alytic effect beyond their direct impact on growth, are the ﬂow of EU
structural funds, the devaluations of 1986 and 1993, and the revitalized
promotion of tourism and inward FDI (including offshore ﬁnancial ser-
vices). Each of these elements also could have a ﬂavor of beggar-thy-
neighbor about them, making it especially important to know whether
they could have been the decisive factors. 
Most often cited by external observers is the expansion in EU struc-
tural funds starting in 1988. As mentioned above, these came at an
extremely opportune time. They helped fund a resumption of public capi-
tal spending, which had been pared down as part of the ﬁscal adjustment.
After the austerity of the 1980s, a backlog of socially productive invest-
ment projects was available to absorb the funds, and a further beneﬁt of
the European Union’s role was to ensure that they were deployed with
comparatively little dead weight.58 They were countercyclical, too, insu-
lating Ireland from the Gulf War recession. The inﬂow of funds (which
still continues, although now running much below the peak) had a
demand effect as well as boosting the ability of the infrastructure to sus-
tain the greatly increased level of economic activity. These very substan-
tial transfers are estimated to have lifted the level of Irish GDP on a
sustained basis by as much as 4 percent. Although not trivial, this boost is
dwarfed by the exceptional growth rates recorded after 1995.59
Unlike that of 1993, the devaluation of 1986 was not simply defensive.
Its role has also been discussed above. Here again the direct impact can
only have been a transitory one, although by generating external demand
at a time when the ﬁscal correction was restoring conﬁdence, it may have
50 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
57. Blanchﬂower and Oswald (2000).
58. Honohan (1997); Barry, Bradley, and Hannan (2001).
59. Not all the EU inﬂows have been beneﬁcial. The price support mechanisms of the
Common Agricultural Policy represented a large transfer to Ireland but may have long
delayed improvements in agricultural efﬁciency.
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competitiveness. 
International tourism and travel receipts did start to rise after 1986 and
showed a sustained growth of over 8 percent a year to the end of the cen-
tury. This development has been generally attributed to airline deregula-
tion,60 measures taken to expand capacity, and a revitalized promotional
strategy, although improved price competitiveness should not be forgotten.
Here too there has been a lasting and considerable effect, but total receipts
come to little more than 4 percent of GNP. The role of inward FDI promo-
tion has also been discussed above. The major new development was in
offshore ﬁnancial services; the claims of some of the participants in indus-
trial promotion that the strategy was decisively reformed at that time on a
wider front lack convincing evidence: the indications are that the agencies
have been effective and adaptive to changing circumstances throughout
the past half century, as indicated by their long history of success in
attracting a large share of U.S. outward FDI in manufacturing. Nonethe-
less, the timing of the employment boom from 1993 onward does coincide
with the gathering pace of the U.S. boom and the U.S. appetite for imports,
some of which was met from afﬁliates located in Ireland. 
Absent from our list of catalysts is Ireland’s commitment to the EU
common currency project. As predicted, interest rates converged to low
German levels in the runup to the single currency, removing the premium
that had been over 5 percent for much of the 1980s. This contributed to a
consumption and property boom from 1997 on, but that was a relatively
late development and not altogether welcome in its timing. Also missing
from our list are radical overhauls of the social welfare system and the
legal labor market framework. The social welfare system was always rel-
atively ungenerous by European standards, and the level of employment
protection was relatively low.
Popular Explanations That Did Play a Role
Two dominant explanations of the recovery have been the corporatist
social partnership and the lowering of tax rates. Although these were key
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hypothesis. They were part of the process that ensured that political econ-
omy and wage setting got back on a sustainable path. 
As discussed, the importance of the social partnership from 1986 on
cannot be dismissed. The partnership agreements did reﬂect a determina-
tion to set aside, for the time being, social class antagonism in favor of a
joint effort to remove barriers to employment growth. But at the same
time, the key precondition for the adoption of these agreements was the
widespread recognition that the crisis in the public ﬁnances must be
resolved and that the key to unemployment reduction could not be found
in ﬁscal expansion. This did require dismantling of encrusted attitudes
and behavior on the shop ﬂoor, and it likely also beneﬁted from an erosion
of wider institutional sclerosis;61 these might not have been achieved
without the lengthy period of malaise in the early 1980s. 
Likewise, the income tax rate reductions, which did have a signiﬁcant
effect on the typical worker’s after-tax income, sometimes attributed to
the partnership process, were evidently part and parcel of the ﬁscal nor-
malization. Thus our preferred characterization embodies and encom-
passes these two important policy ingredients, which can be seen as
aspects of the wider normalization.
Our conclusion is that there was no single magic ingredient. Many sep-
arate factors contributed. Given the already generally market-friendly and
outward-looking orientation of long-standing structural policy, together
with the emphasis on education spending, removal of the barriers posed
by the unsustainable trajectory of debt and taxation in the 1980s was
enough to unleash the hare. The initial gap in the employment-population
ratio between Ireland and other countries meant that the room for catch-
up was large. Some progress toward convergence was already evident in
the 1960s, but in the 1990s the rate of catch-up accelerated dramatically
as the upward trend of the tax burden was reversed and conﬁdence was
restored in the management of the public ﬁnances. A favorable conjunc-
ture of external factors and a collective determination not to repeat the
errors of the 1970s also helped.
A Lucky Period for a Regional Economy
With an economy that amounts to only about 1 percent of either euro-
area or U.S. GDP and is extremely open to trade and factor ﬂows, and
52 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
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has many of the characteristics of a relatively small region of a larger
economy rather than those we associate with a sovereign country.62
Viewed as such, its performance during the 1990s was unexceptional by
American standards, albeit unmatched in Europe. If Ireland had been a
U.S. state, its population growth rate in the 1990s would have ranked
twenty-third out of the ﬁfty states—between New Hampshire and Missis-
sippi. No fewer than nine U.S. metropolitan areas with populations over
1 million grew faster than Greater Dublin. To be sure, no other European
countries or metropolitan areas achieved Ireland’s rates of economic and
demographic growth in the 1990s. The percentage increase in employ-
ment in Ireland was almost 2.7 times that of the next best performing
economy, the Netherlands, and four to ﬁve times those of Sweden, Nor-
way, Denmark, and Belgium. This paper does not attempt a comparative
assessment of “eurosclerosis,” but it is relevant to note that the natural
increase in the labor force of other European countries is much lower than
in Ireland.
Thus our reading of the Irish miracle is that it was essentially a deferred
and telescoped process of bringing more of the population into a modern
sector that was already close to the production frontier a quarter century
ago; however, we do not deny that Ireland has been well placed to beneﬁt
from shifting global technology. Already by the 1980s the country’s com-
parative advantage (especially considering the skills and aptitudes of the
labor force) and tax policy had disproportionately favored information
technology and pharmaceuticals among manufacturing industries: incum-
bency allowed Ireland to beneﬁt disproportionately from the strong sub-
sequent growth of MNC production in these industries. Then again, a
relatively young and rapidly growing English-speaking work force with
relatively high educational attainment was the ideal factor of production to
be employed in rapidly growing information technology-using activities
ranging from software localization through computer-assisted call centers
(serving, for example, airline and hotel reservation systems) to more
sophisticated  ﬁnancial services. Even worries about the carcinogenic
potential of a depleted ozone layer have meant that Ireland’s cloudy and
damp climate no longer seemed as much of a barrier to the booming
tourism industry in which indoor (barroom) activities play a large part.
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reversed. 
It has been a lucky period, then, for Ireland, but one during which pol-
icymakers and the social partners, shaken into realism by earlier disas-
ters, seized the opportunities that were on offer with greater prudence,
realism, and restraint than before. In the fable, the hare did not win its
race with the tortoise, and although much has been achieved, Ireland has
not assumed economic leadership in any significant industrial sector. The
exceptional growth spurt has come to an end, partly through a self-
correction as well as because of the global economic slowdown, and it
has left Ireland close to, but not yet at, the frontier in income per capita.
What remains to be seen is whether the improved performance on a broad
front can be maintained in more difficult times and with most of the
potential for catch-up exhausted. Given the heightened expectations and
the reemerging pressures on current spending, the task of demand man-
agement in the slowdown looks particularly challenging.
APPENDIX
Calculating the “Entrepôt Economy”
FOUR SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES within Irish manufacturing display the
unusual characteristics of the entrepôt economy:63 “other foods” (domi-
nated by cola concentrate manufacturers), pharmaceuticals and related
basic chemicals, software reproduction, and computer components. These
industries are important employers: together they employed about a ﬁfth
of the manufacturing work force, or 3 percent of the total work force, in
1999. But their contribution to industrial output (57 percent) and GDP
(15 percent) is vastly disproportionate to their employment levels. Because
the relative importance of these industries has been growing, excluding
them reveals a very different story so far as output and productivity
growth rates are concerned. 
More subtly, we can make an adjustment to the output of these indus-
tries by excluding that part of their value added that seems to represent the
54 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
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ative to GDP) quantities of goods are imported and then reexported, often after minimal or
no processing.
0675-01 BPEA/Honohan  7/22/02  1:15 PM  Page 54return to intangible capital abroad, whether in the form of high profit
remittances, royalties, or otherwise.64 Table A1 illustrates this approach
for 1999. We refer to the adjustment as a measure of entrepôt-type output
or value added. The upper panel includes royalties and other non-
industrial service inputs; these are excluded in the lower panel, which
thus refers just to value added. Figure A1 plots estimated entrepôt value
added for 1980–99, along with the total profits of MNCs, expressed as a
share of GDP. (Ideally the price deflators would also be adjusted, but the
information that would allow us to do so is not available.)
This also leads to very sizable changes in measures of the growth of
output and productivity. Using the adjusted output ﬁgures brings GDP
growth down by 2 percentage points—from 8.2 percent to 6.2 percent—
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64. The method essentially assumes that, without transfer pricing, apparent productiv-
ity in these industries would be equal to the EU average for the same or related industries
(Honohan, Maître, and Conroy, 1998). We also include the computer assembly industry,
which has displayed similar characteristics, although more in previous years than recently.
Figure A1. Alternative Measures of Ireland’s Entrepôt Economy, 1980–99
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from Central Statistics Ofﬁce Ireland, Census of Industrial Production and
National Income and Expenditure; Eurostat, Panorama of European Business, 2000; and ESRI database.
a. Other foods (primarily cola concentrates), pharmaceuticals and basic chemicals, software reproduction, and computer
components. 
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0675-01 BPEA/Honohan  7/22/02  1:15 PM  Page 56during 1995–99. The growth rate of apparent labor productivity in manu-
facturing falls by almost 5 percentage points—from 8.6 percent to
3.8 percent; for GDP, apparent labor productivity falls by 2 percentage
points—from 3.4 percent to 1.4 percent—in these years.65 Crude though
these adjustments are, they are likely to underestimate the effects, inas-
much as they ignore other manufacturing industries also affected, albeit to
a lesser extent, and the offshore ﬁnancial services industry.
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65. A discontinuity in aggregate employment statistics in 1997–98 complicates the
analysis.
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Discussion
Olivier Blanchard: This paper is wise and informative and contains two
important warnings: 
—Beware of numbers, especially in a small economy with a large
export-import sector, low taxation of proﬁts, and transfer pricing. 
—Beware of monocausal explanations. No single factor, whether it be
the low taxation of foreign ﬁrms, the subsidies from the European Union,
the increase in the level of education, or the expansionary effects of ﬁscal
consolidation—to cite just some of the theories ﬂoating about in the liter-
ature—can account for the Irish boom. 
But the paper goes too far in declaring that what is at work is a simple,
run-of-the-mill catch-up story. The authors undersell their country’s per-
formance: perhaps proximity has bred excessive contempt. After reading
their paper and digesting the evidence, I have three main reactions: 
—From a greater distance, but still looking carefully at the numbers,
the Irish economic performance of the last ﬁfteen years does look quite
miraculous, especially when one looks not only at productivity but also at
employment.
—The proximate cause appears easy to identify, namely, wage moder-
ation leading to lower costs, higher proﬁts, and large increases in labor
and capital. 
—The very strong effects of this wage moderation suggest, however,
unusual mechanisms at work. In an economy such as Ireland, which is
open to trade, capital ﬂows, and, most important, labor ﬂows, wage explo-
sions can kill, but wage moderation can work miracles. The latter is what
has happened in Ireland over the last ﬁfteen years. Let me develop each of
these themes in turn.
58
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that the proﬁts generated by foreign ﬁrms may reﬂect little else than cre-
ative transfer pricing in response to low proﬁt tax rates in Ireland. The
question is how much this affects the numbers for aggregate output and
productivity growth. I believe the impression given by the paper is a bit
misleading. The correction is far from negligible, but even after the cor-
rection the performance of output and of implied productivity remains
impressive. 
To explore the issue, I went back to the data set for the Irish business
sector maintained by the OECD. (That database, unfortunately, has been
discontinued, and therefore the series depicted in the ﬁgures below stop in
1997, missing some of the most impressive years of the Irish boom.) I
considered three alternative series for output. The ﬁrst is business sector
GDP. The second is business sector GDP net of all proﬁts repatriated by
foreign ﬁrms; the implicit assumption is that these proﬁts represent only
transfer pricing, not value added. Because this correction may be too
strong, I constructed a third series, business sector GDP minus half of the
proﬁts repatriated by foreign ﬁrms. 
The upper panel of my figure 1 plots the logarithms of these three
series from 1971 to 1997. Each series is normalized to zero in 1971, so
that the scale gives the proportional increase in each series since 1971.
The differences among the three series (13 percent between the highest
and the lowest in 1997) are clearly visible, but they hardly change the
general conclusion: output growth has been very rapid, especially since
the mid-1980s. 
The lower panel of ﬁgure 1 plots the logarithms of the three productiv-
ity series implied by each of the three measures of output. Again the
visual impression is clear: the treatment of repatriated proﬁts makes a dif-
ference, but in all three cases the productivity performance remains
strong. This is especially apparent since the mid-1980s: productivity
growth averages 4.2 percent annually from 1985 to 1997, for example,
when unadjusted output is used, and a still-high 3.4 percent when output
net of repatriated proﬁts is used. (The difference between these numbers
and those in the authors’ ﬁgure 14 must derive in large part from the fact
that I look only at the business sector here.)
Looking at productivity growth alone, however, misses the other part
of the Irish miracle, namely, employment growth. Since 1985, employ-
ment has increased at an average annual rate of 2.7 percent, obviously a
Patrick Honohan and Brendan Walsh 59
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Figure 1. Alternative Measures of Business Sector Output and Labor 
Productivity, 1971–97
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the OECD business sector database.
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0675-01 BPEA/Honohan  7/22/02  1:15 PM  Page 60very high number. This has been achieved not only through a large
decrease in unemployment, but also through an increase in labor force
participation and through migration back to Ireland. 
In short, even after this correction, the performance of both Irish pro-
ductivity and Irish employment since the mid-1980s is very impressive. I
do not know the rules by which miracles are ofﬁcially deﬁned, but this
seems to come close. 
The trigger: wage moderation. In a comment two years ago, on a
Brookings Paper by Jean-Paul Fitoussi and others on unemployment in
Europe, I focused on two “miracle” countries: the Netherlands and Ire-
land.1 In the case of Ireland, I argued that wage moderation, that is, wage
growth below the rate consistent with technological progress, appeared to
be the proximate source of the reduction in unemployment, both through
higher proﬁts and sustained capital accumulation, and through an increase
in the ratio of employment to capital. In the light of the output measure-
ment problems emphasized in this paper, I returned to my computations
and looked at the implications of using the three measures of output
described above. Figure 2 shows the results. 
To achieve a balanced growth path with stable unemployment in an
economy where technological progress is labor augmenting (the only
form consistent with the existence of a balanced growth path), the real
wage should grow at the rate of (Harrod-neutral) technological progress.
With this motivation, the upper panel of figure 2 shows the change over
time in the adjusted real wage, that is, the real wage divided by the con-
structed index of Harrod-neutral technological progress. The three lines
correspond to the three different measures of technological progress
implied by the three different measures of output discussed earlier. Once
again the message is clear. Beginning in the early 1980s, the adjusted
real wage starts declining. Which output series is used to construct the
index of technological progress affects the extent of the decline, but not
the overall trend: by 1997 the adjusted real wage is between 52 percent
(using the unadjusted output measure) and 30 percent (using the fully
adjusted output measure) below its 1980 level—a large decline in all
three cases. 
Standard production theory implies that a decrease in the adjusted real
wage should have two effects. It should lead to an increase in the ratio of
Patrick Honohan and Brendan Walsh 61
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Figure 2. Alternative Measures of Real Wages and Capital per Worker, 1971–97
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the OECD business sector database.
a. Employment is multiplied by an index of technological progress.
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ical progress) to capital, and it should lead (through higher proﬁts) to sus-
tained high investment. 
The lower panel of ﬁgure 2 shows the changes over the same period in
the ratio of adjusted employment to capital, again for the three series cor-
responding to the different deﬁnitions of output. The ﬁgure shows that
ﬁrms have steadily increased the ratio of adjusted employment to capital
since the mid-1980s: from 25 percent to 50 percent depending on the
series. The effect on investment is also evident from the data: since 1987
the average annual rate of growth of ﬁxed investment has been a high
8.7 percent (not shown). 
However, identifying wage moderation as the proximate cause of the
Irish boom is only the start of the story. It raises two questions. What led
to this wage moderation? And why have the effects been so large? 
I suspect the answers to both questions come largely from the openness
of the Irish economy, with openness in goods markets, openness in capital
markets, and openness in labor markets each playing a separate role. In
such an economy, shocks, whether favorable or unfavorable, can have
large effects not only on the level of output but on its growth rate as well.
Put another way, an open economy may behave very much as predicted
by the AK models—models that exhibit constant returns to accumulable
factors—developed by growth theorists a decade or so ago. De facto con-
stant returns may lead shocks to have long-lasting effects. In the context
of Ireland, bad policies may not only decrease output but also kill long-
term growth—the story up to the mid-1980s—and wage moderation may
not only increase output but sustain faster growth as well. Let me develop
this theme a bit further.
Openness in capital markets. In a closed economy, a decrease in wages
leads to an increase in the proﬁt rate. The extent to which capital increases
in response depends on the slope of the supply of capital. The less elastic
is supply, the smaller the effect on capital accumulation and on output. 
In a small, open economy like Ireland, the world interest rate is given,
and so the response of capital and output to wage moderation is larger.
This relation and its empirical relevance for Ireland are well understood
and are documented in the paper: much of Ireland’s growth has been asso-
ciated with foreign direct investment, attracted to Ireland by high proﬁts
and low taxation. The openness of capital markets, however, cannot sus-
tain faster growth forever. As capital comes in, pressure on employment
Patrick Honohan and Brendan Walsh 63
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the growth rate. 
Openness in labor markets. This is where the other dimensions of
openness become relevant. One characteristic of Ireland, again shown
clearly by the authors, is the importance of migration: emigration for
much of Ireland’s history, immigration back to Ireland more recently. 
The evidence is clear that Ireland is, in effect, part of a larger labor
market, that of the United Kingdom. Whether Irish workers work in
Ireland or in Britain clearly depends on relative unemployment rates in
the two countries (see the authors’ ﬁgure 8) and, theory suggests, on rela-
tive wages in the two countries. (The latter is a more controversial point
empirically in the case of Ireland, but one that I have to believe is
relevant.) 
This fact offers a potential key to explaining both wage moderation and
its sustained effects on output in the last ﬁfteen years. The authors
attribute wage moderation to the successful use of collective bargaining.
They may be right. But one of the factors behind the responsible behavior
of unions must be the constraints imposed by labor mobility. One
mechanical explanation for the decrease in adjusted real wages we saw
earlier goes as follows: Arbitrage by workers choosing whether to stay in
Britain or come back to Ireland has forced wages in Ireland to grow
roughly at the same rate as in the United Kingdom. But because the rate of
technological progress has been higher in Ireland than in the United King-
dom, this equalization of wage growth has led to a steady decrease in real
wages relative to technological progress in Ireland, and thus to a decrease
in the adjusted real wage. This explanation may be too mechanical, but I
suspect that it captures an important cause of wage moderation in Ireland. 
The same mechanism can explain why wage moderation has led to sus-
tained rapid growth in Ireland. Assume that a country has access to a fully
elastic supply of workers: in the case of Ireland, the pool of Irish working
abroad but willing to come back home. Under these conditions, wage
moderation will lead to sustained faster growth. Higher proﬁts will lead to
greater capital accumulation. The increase in capital will in turn lead to
immigration, and thus to higher employment. The economy will in effect
operate under constant returns. As in AK models, the lower the (adjusted)
wage, the higher the proﬁt rate, and the higher the rate of growth of out-
put. This seems to capture much of what has happened in Ireland over the
64 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
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Until then, Ireland can sustain higher rates of growth of output, capital,
and employment.2
Openness in goods markets. A third mechanism may also have been at
work. A few years back, Jaume Ventura wrote a paper pointing out that
standard trade models had a startling implication for growth: Factor price
equalization implied that, as a country accumulated capital, it could avoid
decreasing returns to capital by shifting steadily to the production and
export of ever more capital-intensive goods. So, although the world econ-
omy might be well described by a standard growth model, individual
countries, especially small ones, might look like AK economies, able to
sustain rapid growth through a steady shift in the composition of their
production toward capital-intensive goods.3
The paper was seen at the time as conceptually important, but its
empirical relevance remained to be established. The Asian tigers
appeared to be the most plausible examples of such a mechanism at play.
I believe that Ireland may provide another example. This belief is based
on work by John Romalis in his doctoral thesis at the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology.4 Romalis looked at trends in the capital and the skill
content of trade for a number of countries over time. (The argument for
skills is the same as for capital: as workers in a country become more edu-
cated, the country shifts to more-skill-intensive goods, and in doing so
avoids decreasing returns to skill.) One of the countries he examined was
Ireland. One of his ﬁgures, reproduced here as ﬁgure 3, gives the ﬂavor of
his results. It shows the Irish share of U.S. imports by skill intensity for
three different dates. In the 1960s the largest share was that of low-skill-
intensity goods, but over time the distribution has shifted in favor of
higher-skill-intensity goods. This documents that changes in the trade
structure have taken place in the direction suggested by the theory. It does
not prove but does at least suggest that trade in goods may have helped
Ireland ﬁght decreasing returns to the accumulation of skills and capital.
If so, then even in the absence of capital and labor mobility, we can think
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2. This mechanism was at the center of the explanation for employment and wage
dynamics across U.S. states that Lawrence Katz and I offered in a Brookings Paper in 1992
(Blanchard and Katz, 1992).
3. Ventura (1997).
4. An updated version is Romalis (2002).
0675-01 BPEA/Honohan  7/22/02  1:15 PM  Page 65of Ireland as having operated somewhat like an AK economy, with close
to constant returns to capital. And in such an economy, once again, shocks
can have sustained effects not only on the level of output but also on its
long-term growth rate. 
I have been looking at the effects of each of these three channels in iso-
lation. In combination, they come close to implying indeterminacy. Only
adjustment costs explain where the economy is today, and small shocks
can lead to very large changes in output. In combination with exogenous
technological progress, these channels can even lead to ever-increasing or
ever-decreasing growth rates. I am far from understanding, either concep-
tually or empirically, what role each of these channels has played in the
case of Ireland. But they appear to have the potential to explain why Ire-
land did so badly from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s and has done so
well since—in other words, to explain the delayed catch-up that this paper
has emphasized. 
Barry Bosworth: The transformation and growth of the Irish economy in
the last decade have been extraordinary—and all the more remarkable
66 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
Figure 3. Share of U.S. Imports from Ireland, by Skill Intensity, 1960, 1980, 1998
Sources: Romalis (2002).
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to be a case study of tremendous interest to economists who would like to
explain why some countries grow and others do not, and what countries
should do to promote growth. It should also be of great interest to the rest
of the EU countries, which are struggling to ﬁnd ways to create jobs.
Patrick Honohan and Brendan Walsh have provided a rich discussion
of the factors behind the Irish economic boom, but not a dramatic conclu-
sion to the question of why. Instead they cite a mixture of many factors
that coalesced in a somewhat unspeciﬁed fashion. Although the paper
clearly documents the magnitude of the growth acceleration, I would like
to use a growth accounting framework to highlight some of the points in
the paper, particularly those that relate to the causes of the turnaround.
Thus my table 1 reports annual rates of change in Irish business sector
output and its division between employment gains and improvements in
labor productivity for selected periods. The latter is further separated into
the contribution of changes in capital per worker and in total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP). In the authors’ discussion of policy changes and eco-
nomic growth, 1987 emerges as a reasonable dating of a regime change,
both because of the timing of the ﬁscal correction and because of the
adoption of a new form of centralized labor bargaining.
From 1960 to 1987 Ireland made very little progress, as measured by
GDP per capita, toward convergence with the advanced economies—and
private employment was stagnant over the period. The one surprise is the
high rate of apparent growth in labor productivity and real wages, partic-
ularly before 1973.
The magnitude of the policy adjustments in the late 1980s might have
been expected to have some transition costs, and there was a global reces-
sion in 1990–91. Thus I use 1992 to mark the beginning of the high-
growth period. Output in the business sector grew at an average annual
rate of almost 9 percent in 1992–2000, and employment increased even
more dramatically. Here the surprise is that employment gains fully
account for the acceleration of output growth; growth in labor productiv-
ity and real wages actually slowed relative to the 1961–87 period. Even
more surprising, if one is interested in making some comparison with the
experience of the East Asian economies, growth in capital barely kept up
with growth in employment, and there is no observable contribution from
increased capital per worker. Finally, the rate of real wage growth slowed
well below the rate of change in TFP.
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0675-01 BPEA/Honohan  7/22/02  1:15 PM  Page 68What should we make of this in trying to account for Ireland’s boom?
First, the paper suggests that the boom itself might be a statistical mirage.
In an effort to minimize taxes, multinational corporations operating in Ire-
land may use distorted transfer prices to allocate a large proportion of
their proﬁts to Ireland, which has a low corporate tax rate. If so, the
recorded measures of capital income earned in Ireland, and thus Irish
GDP, would be overstated. As evidence, Honohan and Walsh cite some
very high measures of value added per worker in industries dominated by
MNCs: ten to twenty times higher than corresponding numbers in the rest
of the European Union. They then construct two adjusted measures of
GDP: the ﬁrst excludes the repatriated proﬁts of MNCs, and the second
excludes “excess” reported proﬁts in industries dominated by MNCs. As
my table 2 shows, the adjustment sharply reduces estimated output
growth over the 1990s. If the adjustment were carried through to the busi-
ness sector, the estimated growth in labor productivity and TFP would be
dramatically reduced, bringing it more in line with the performance of
real wages.
The ﬁrst adjustment is not particularly compelling, because it does not
seem reasonable to exclude all of the MNCs’ repatriated proﬁts from
GDP to correct for a proportionate overstatement. For their alternative
estimate of excess “entrepôt” proﬁts, the authors have only one year of
data comparable to the corresponding EU data. They use these data to
extend the alternative estimates back to 1980 on the basis of a ﬁxed rela-
tionship of proﬁts to productivity in total manufacturing. The speciﬁc
industries involved in the excess proﬁt calculation have grown tremen-
dously over the last two decades, and the authors have direct observations
on extremely high values for the ratio of value added to labor payments.
As discussed below, I believe that this issue of transfer pricing is critical
to some explanations of the Irish performance.
It is useful to group the potential explanations of Ireland’s improved
performance into three categories: innovation in the production process
(supply), labor market reforms, and a demand-side stimulus. I think we
can rule out the ﬁrst explanation, which amounts to a large productivity
innovation like that argued to have occurred in the United States after
1995. There is no acceleration in the growth of labor productivity or TFP;
in fact, even without any adjustment for excess entrepôt proﬁts, the data
suggest some deceleration. It is immediately evident that the story for Ire-
land is much different from that for East Asia, another area of remarkable
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rise in the proportion of the working-age population that is employed,
encompassing both a substantial rise in the labor force participation rate
and a decline in unemployment. Thus we are left with two broad alterna-
tive explanations for the improved performance: labor market reforms or
a demand-side stimulus.
The notion of changes in the structure of the labor market is very
appealing, if for no other reason than that Ireland has succeeded where the
rest of Europe has failed: in creating jobs. The lack of labor market ﬂexi-
bility has also been highlighted in most discussions of Europe’s economic
performance. One aspect not discussed by the authors is that the OECD
has rated Ireland as second only to the United Kingdom in having the
least restrictive employment protection legislation in Europe. The only
problem is that that seems to have always been true, and the changes in
labor market institutions since 1985 seem to have been quite minor. It is
hard to identify a major preexisting barrier to the employment of a popu-
lation that was obviously willing to work, as evidenced by the large out-
ward migration in search of jobs.
The authors stress the importance of the centralized bargaining agree-
ments reached in the mid-1980s, and they point to a dramatic decline in
industrial strife. They also mention a series of smaller tax and regulatory
reforms that might add up to a regime change in labor markets, but the
direct evidence is limited.
In previous work on the decline in unemployment in Ireland and the
Netherlands, Olivier Blanchard stressed the shortfall of wage growth rel-
ative to that warranted by gains in TFP.1 That result still holds in the ofﬁ-
70 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
1. Blanchard (2000).
Table 2. Alternative Measures of Real GDP Growth, 1985–2000 
Percent a year
GDP less GDP less
Period GDP MNC proﬁts entrepôt proﬁts
1961–73 4.4
1973–87 2.7 2.8
1987–92 4.2 3.6 4.6
1992–2000 8.5 6.3 6.5
1995–2000 9.9 7.4 7.7
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from OECD Statistical Compendium, 2001.
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with their argument that GDP is inﬂated by excess entrepôt proﬁts. Their
adjustment to GDP would lower the warranted growth rate and eliminate
the evidence of a shortfall of wage increases. If we accept the argument
for adjusting output growth, Blanchard’s explanation has less credence.
The authors also address this issue in their evaluation of whether a
moderation of wage demands in Ireland has contributed to an improved
competitive position. I have difﬁculty with their measure, however,
because it is based on adjusting a measure of the real exchange rate for the
trend observed over the 1975–87 period. The exchange rate actually
changed very little over the 1990s, but they adjust the index upward by
about 1 percent a year. Thus the adjustment is responsible for nearly all of
the increase shown in their ﬁgure 5.
Yet there is no doubt that Ireland has had a tremendous export boom.
Why did that occur if not because of an improved relative cost situation?
Some have argued that the boom was a response to the move toward a sin-
gle market in Europe, which made Ireland, with a well-educated, English-
speaking work force on the edge of Europe, an attractive business
location. However, the story does not ﬁt the pattern of Ireland’s export
growth. As my table 3 shows, the share of exports going to the other EU
countries including the United Kingdom has declined, and that going to
continental Europe has remained roughly constant. Instead the most dra-
matic increase in exports has been to the United States. There has also
been a large increase in imports from the rest of the world (principally
Asia). Ireland looks like a middleman in a vastly expanded trade between
Asia and the United States.
Equally noteworthy, the tradable goods sector represents a declining
share of employment in Ireland. Thus it is difﬁcult to point to exports as a
primary demand-side inﬂuence. The breadth of the employment gains
across a multitude of sectors is a striking feature of the 1990s.
This paper actually produces considerable evidence that much of the
Irish export story may be transfer pricing. First, the abnormality in value
added per worker in the five entrepôt sectors that the authors analyze is
extreme. If one carries their adjustment through to the expenditure side
of the national accounts, it eliminates any evidence of a net contribution
of trade to GDP growth. Second, as already noted, the greatest growth in
exports has been to the United States, not Europe, and this looks more
consistent with the argument that U.S. firms are using Ireland for tax
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export industries only matches that in the economy as a whole, and the
share of employment in manufacturing as a whole declined over the
period.
Perhaps the authors are right that the turnaround in the Irish economy
is the result of a coalescing of many factors, but such an explanation is not
very satisfying if one is looking for lessons for other countries. On bal-
ance, I emerged from a reading of the paper believing that the most con-
vincing explanation for the turnaround in the Irish economy is a series of
changes in labor markets. That explanation is most compatible with the
breadth of the employment gains, but it is difﬁcult to identify the speciﬁc
institutional changes.
General discussion: Susan Collins applauded the authors for exploring a
range of factors that may have contributed to Ireland’s virtuous circle
rather than searching for some magic bullet. Because it is difﬁcult to iden-
tify the role of individual factors with data from a single country, she sug-
gested two ways to expand the analysis by looking at other countries’
experience. One way would be to look at a sample of countries with simi-
lar initial economic characteristics but different take-off experiences; this
could provide clues as to why some countries succeed and, in particular,
what made Ireland different. On this basis, she conjectured that Ireland’s
close ties to the United States might have been a key factor in its success
relative to other countries. 
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Table 3. Geographical Composition of Irish Trade, 1985–2000 
Percent
United  Other EU  Rest of 
Year United States Kingdom countries the world
Exports
1985 9.5 33.2 36.2 21.1
1990 8.2 33.8 41.1 16.9
1995 8.4 25.6 46.7 19.3
2000 17.0 19.9 40.0 23.1
Imports
1985 16.9 42.8 23.6 16.7
1990 14.4 42.6 24.2 18.7
1995 17.9 35.7 20.6 25.9
2000 16.2 33.4 22.5 27.9
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, various years.
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between Ireland and other countries that have succeeded, such as South
Korea. Collins listed increased competitiveness, sensible macroeconomic
policies, and improvements in the dependency ratio as three factors that
seemed important to growth in both Ireland and South Korea. But she also
noted that the source of Ireland’s capital ﬁnancing was very different
from South Korea’s. Like other East Asian countries, South Korea
reversed its current account deﬁcit largely through a dramatic increase in
private sector saving. Ireland has been much more dependent on external
capital from multinational corporations and foreign direct investment.
She suggested that the reasons for and the consequences of this difference
would be worth examining. 
Alan Blinder questioned the characterization of Ireland’s growth as a
return to a previously established, but interrupted, convergence with other
European economies. He pointed out that if Irish GDP had simply contin-
ued to grow at the same rate after 1973, the year when convergence was
allegedly interrupted, as it had between 1960 and 1973, GDP at the end of
the 1990s would have been far below the level it actually reached. He
argued that the rapid rise in output after 1992 was what needed explain-
ing, and he listed three possible explanations: an export demand shock, a
rise in private domestic investment, and a consumption demand shock
generated by an increase in population. 
Adam Posen was dubious of the prominence the authors assigned to
ﬁscal policy as a factor in Ireland’s growth experience. He found the data
on ﬁscal changes unclear and noted that interest rates showed little evi-
dence of the crowding-out mechanism through which important ﬁscal
policy moves would be expected to affect output. He reasoned that the
contentious nature of coalition government makes radical ﬁscal changes
difﬁcult, especially when, as was the case with Ireland, there are no fun-
damental changes in the structure of government or the budgetary process
that could overcome the inertia. 
Robert Shimer underscored the importance of labor supply and labor
demand in the paper. He listed several pieces of evidence favoring labor
supply as the likely primary driver of wages and employment: the matur-
ing of a baby bulge, a large increase in women’s labor force participation,
and a decrease in marginal tax rates for the average worker. William
Branson noted that the model proposed by Olivier Blanchard of growth
generated by an elastic Irish labor supply, in which wage moderation
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differentiate Ireland from Southeast Asia, where labor immigration is
tightly controlled. Branson noted that Singapore had deliberately pushed
up wages in order to attract capital-intensive investment from abroad. He
also suggested constructing a variable equal to the real wage times the
probability of ﬁnding a job as a way to combine Blanchard’s explanation,
of labor supply reacting to changes in the real wage, with the authors’
emphasis on labor being attracted by declining unemployment. 
Benjamin Friedman remarked that the primary motivating fact for the
paper—Ireland’s jump from twenty-fourth to ninth place in the world
income rankings—might be subject to correction if the effects of transfer
pricing are taken into account. He also suggested that oil prices were a
prime candidate to explain the medium-term swings in the Irish current
account over 1973–2000, and he noted that these current account swings
could impact productivity and unemployment through a number of mech-
anisms, producing the dynamic loop between internal and external bal-
ance shown in the authors’ ﬁgure 2. 
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